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Abstract
Mobile technologies with limited resources, such as smart phones or PDAs, have
increased dramatically in popularity. However, the level of security provided for these
technologies has not kept pace with the value of the data that they contain or transmit.

Wireless networks usually provide some security, in the form of encryption. GSM and
GPRS use different forms of the A5 algorithm, and Wi-Fi uses WEP or WPA. These
encryption algorithms have proven weaknesses and in some cases have been
efficiently cracked. To improve the security of wireless networks, stronger encryption
algorithms need to be developed. One of the most attractive algorithms for this is
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This is because it uses very small key sizes,
which can result in smaller system parameters, smaller processors, faster
implementations and lower power requirements.

This thesis investigates two different ECC algorithms, ECIES and a hybrid of AES
and ECC, over two finite fields, on mobile devices with limited resources. Both
algorithms are implemented and then executed across a wired, Wi-Fi, GPRS and 3G
networks to evaluate their performance. From these performance results it is
established that:
•

ECC is appropriate for mobile devices,

•

That the GF(2"’) field is the most efficient finite field

•

That the network type has a serious impact on the performance of the
encryption operations and transfers.

In this way, ECC can allow for user controlled end-to-end secure channels, across a
mixed network infrastructure, where appropriately used.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Wireless communications is becoming one of the most active areas of technology
development in the world today. Its development is being driven by the evolving
needs of both corporate and private consumers, from a medium that just supports
voice into a medium that supports a wide range of other services, such as the
transmission of data, text and images. Because of this, wireless communication covers
a very wide range of technologies. These include Wide Area Networks (WAN), such
as GSM (Global Systems for Mobile Communications), GPRS (General Packet Radio
Service) or 3G, Local Area Networks (LAN), such as Wi-Fi and Personal Area
Networks (PAN), such as Bluetooth.

With the improvement in wireless communication and the dramatic reduction in the
price of mobile devices, the demand for mobile technologies is increasing, with users
often owning more than one mobile device. For example, the number of mobile
subscribers increased from 1.2 billion in 2003 [1] to 3 billion by the middle of 2007
[2]. As of 2003, the telecommunications industry was one of the largest industries in
the world, making more than $1 trillion annually from services and equipment [1].

In 2007, 25% of people used their mobile devices to access the Internet, which works
out to be about 825 million people worldwide [3]. As these people can use their
mobile devices to conduct all sorts of businesses, such as personal banking or
accessing sensitive corporate information across the Internet, it is important that the
data remains secure. However mobile devices have different characteristics, and
therefore different security issues to stationary, wired devices. These security issues
can include the fact that there is a greater chance of a mobile device being stolen or
lost, data being intercepted while being transmitted across a wireless network using
wireless “sniffers” and hackers accessing a network through a mobile device. One of
the ways to improve the security of data on these devices is to implement a strong
encryption algorithm.

At present the encryption algorithms, that are automatically provided, depend on the
type of wireless networks being used by the device. For example, GSM and GPRS use
a form of the A5 encryption algorithm and Wi-Fi use WEP (Wired Equivalent
Privacy) or WPA (Wireless Application Protocol). However, each of these wireless
technologies have a number of security issues, such as weak encryption algorithms,
which can often cause the users to distrust the security provided and seek a superior
system.

Based on the fact that the use of mobile devices, to conduct and transmit private data,
is increasing dramatically and that the security provided is often very weak, the
research objective of this thesis is to improve the level of security on mobile devices
with limited resources. This will be achieved by implementing a strong encryption
algorithm called Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Two different ECC encryption
algorithms, ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme) and a hybrid of
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) and ECC, were implemented over two finite
fields on two different mobile devices.

ECC is a relatively new asymmetric cryptography scheme, which is becoming an
increasingly attractive cryptographic option for devices with resource limitations,
such as PDAs or smart phones. This is due to the fact that ECC is considered to have
a very strong mathematically based encryption algorithm, while at the same time
using relatively small key sizes. The key sizes used by ECC are very small when
compared to key sizes used by RSA, which is currently one of the most commonly
used forms of asymmetric cryptography. ECC provides the same level of security as
RSA, using much smaller keys; for example a 160-bit ECC key is equal in security to
a 1024-bit RSA key. As the key size is so much smaller, the algorithm can be
executed quickly resulting in the need for smaller processors and system parameters,
and lower power requirements, which makes it idea for restricted mobile devices.

The thesis is arranged in the following way:
•

Chapter 2 examines the three types of wireless technologies available at
present; WANs, LANs, PANs, and the security techniques that are
implemented on each one. It also introduces the two most commonly used

cryptography algorithms AES and RSA and a relatively new algorithm, ECC
and it also explains where this thesis fits within existing literature.
•

Chapter 3 describes the different types of cryptography available, particularly
focusing on AES and ECC. It discusses the finite fields used within ECC, the
operations of ECC, ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem), and
the ECC encryption algorithms that are implemented within this thesis. It also
outlines the main reason why ECC is becoming an attractive alternative to
RSA.

•

Chapter 4 focuses on the architecture of J2ME (Java 2 Micro-Edition), which
is used for the implementation of the ECC encryption algorithms. It also
examines the socket network connection and a technique that can be used to
reduce the size of Java programs, making them applicable to mobile devices.

•

Chapter 5 details the implementation of both of the ECC encryption
algorithms that were outlined in chapter 3 and on the J2ME environment
presented in chapter 4. It is split into a number of different sections, which
deal with the implementation tools, libraries, network connection, sequence of
events within each algorithm and the obfuscator. It also provides the user case,
class, and sequence diagrams.

•

Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the most suitable finite field to use and the
efficiency achieved using each ECC encryption algorithm over different types
of networks. It compares the performance of the ECC encryption algorithms to
the performance of RSA.

•

Finally, chapter 7 presents a summary of the conclusions produced from this
study and outlines proposed areas of future work.

Chapter 2: Mobile and Wireless Technologies
2.1 Introduction
Mobile communication is one of the fastest growing services, and the most
demanding telecommunications applications in the world today. By the middle of July
2007 there were 3 billion mobile subscribers worldwide [2]. The majority of modern
mobile devices can perform almost all of the functionalities and services that were, up
until relatively recently, limited to stationary PC’s or workstations. This means that
subscribers can, not only talk over the mobile devices, but can access many other
services such as the Internet, data transfer and on-line banking. This is due to the
rapid evolution and improvements in wireless technologies, such as WANs, LANs,
and PANs.

However, each different wireless technology has unique features and properties that
affect the distance, speed and type of data that can be transmitted and the security
levels provided.

As more personal and corporate business is being done over wireless networks from
mobile devices, it is important that this data is secure. Although the encryption
algorithms provided by the wireless technologies, such as A5 or WEP, have a certain
number of weaknesses, they are still better than not using any security method. The
level of security can be improved by using stronger encryption algorithms that are
typically used over wired networks, such as AES, RSA or ECC.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will provide an overview
of the different types of wireless technologies, including the evolution of mobile
networks over WANs, LANs and PANs. The next section examines the security that
is available on these different types of networks. The final section will look at the two
most commonly used cryptography algorithms, AES and RSA, and a relatively new
algorithm ECC and identifies which variants would be suitable for wireless mobile
devices.

2.2 Wireless Technology
At the moment there are a number of different types of wireless networks available.
These networks can be sometimes difficult to categorise.However, they generally fall
into three areas;
•

Large wireless networks that run over wireless mobile networks. These are
WANs

such

as

GSM,

GPRS

and

UMTS

(Universal

Mobile

Telecommunication Systems).
•

Wireless networks that run on their own physical layer network, utilizing
antennas ranging in size from small built-in antennas to large ones mounted
on towers. These are LANs such as Wi-Fi.

•

Small wireless networks that are intended only to connect small devices over
short distance. These are PANs such as Bluetooth.

These three wireless network areas will be discussed in more detail in this section,
along with an outline of the security provided in each.

2.2.1 Evolution of wireless mobile networks
Over the past 20 years wireless data communication has improved dramatically. The
first generation, IG, of wireless networks was based on analogue transmission
techniques and was aimed at voice communication over low data rates. The next step,
2G, which was deployed in the early 1990’s [4], involved digital transmission that
provided both voice and data communication. It also provided better quality, higher
speeds and coverage. 3G, which has been deployed since 2000, offers broadband
services, such as mobility, multimedia traffic and Internet, anytime and anywhere
with seamless global roaming

With the evolution of the wireless mobile networks, the level of security provided has
increased. For example, the level of security provided by IG networks was virtually
non-existent, whilst 2G networks provided some basic forms of security by
implementing A3 and/or A5 encryption algorithms. These basic forms of security
were supplemented and improved upon in the 3G networks.
improvements will be discussed later in this chapter.

The security

2.2.1.1

First-Generation Mobile Systems (IG)

The initial concept of cellular telephony was proposed in the early 1970’s [4], but it
wasn’t until 1981 that the first commercial cellular network was deployed by Nordic
Mobile Telephone (NMT). These IG systems were based on analogue technology and
only offered simple wireless voice services. They used Frequency Division
Multiplexing (FDM) access techniques, which meant that each phone call on the
network used a different radio frequency or channel. [5]. IG systems contained no
security mechanism, and so were vulnerable to numerous types of attacks, such as
Subscription spoofing and Man in the middle [6].
2.2.1.2 Second-Generation Mobile Systems
As the demand for cellular subscribers grew, there was a need to increase the network
capacity. This led to the development of digital systems or 2G, which are based on
Digital Multiple Access Technology such as TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access)
and CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access). Along with increasing the network
capacity, 2G improved transmission quality, global roaming capabilities, and lowered
the power consumption. It also provided basic cryptography mechanisms, such as A3
and A5, which are symmetric encryption algorithms. 2G networks operate on a
circuit-switching basis, which means that a connection needs to be established,
between both end devices, before any data can be transferred.
There are a number of examples of 2G networks, such as Cordless Telephone (CT2)
and Personal Access Communication Systems (PACS). However, the most popular
2G wireless technology is Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM), which
was initially used exclusively in Europe but it is now implemented worldwide.
2.2.1.2.1 GSM
GSM was initially proposed in 1982 in order to develop a standard for a mobile
telephone system, which could be used across Europe. However, it wasn’t until 1991
that the first GSM network was deployed. As of September 2005, the GSM family
had 1.5 billion subscribers and 78% of the world market [4].

GSM was designed to use digital rather than analogue technology. Most GSM
systems operate in the 900 MHz and 1.8GHz frequency bands, however in North
America they operate in the 1.9GHz band. GSM uses a combination of TDMA and
FDMA (Frequency Division Multiple Access) technologies to divide the radio
spectrum bandwidth, so that each carrier frequency is 200 KHz wide. To maximise
the use of the frequencies, each one is divided into eight time slots, thus allowing
eight simultaneous calls. GSM can handle voice efficiently. However the support for
data and Internet applications are limited.

GSM was designed with moderate levels of security [7], to try and make the wireless
part of the network as secure as a public switched telephone network. It provides a
basic range of security features such as anonymity by using Temporary Mobile
Subscriber Identity (TMSI), authentication by using the A3 algorithm and user data
and signalling protection by using the A5 algorithm. These security features will be
discussed in more detail in section 2.3.1.
However both of the algorithms, A3/A5, that are used by GSM are vulnerable to a
number of attacks such as known-plain-text, divide-and-conquer and brute-force
attack. In 2000, Alex Biryukov, Adi Shamir and David Wagner showed that a version
of the A5 algorithm could be cracked in real time using a time-memory trade-off
attack [9]. The security provided by GSM can now be considered very basic.
2.2.1.3 2.5-Generation Mobile Systems
2.5G was a stepping-stone between 2G and 3G. It was introduced to enhance the data
capacity of 2G systems and to eliminate some of their limitations. One of these
limitations is the fact that a connection needs to be established before any data can be
transferred. This is very inefficient if only a small amount of data is being transmitted.
To solve this problem, 2.5G uses packet-switching which allows a mobile station to
be packet switched, so that data can be sent and/or received without needing to create
a special connection [5][10].

Two of the most important 2.5G data technologies are GPRS (General Packet Radio
Service) and WAP (Wireless Application Protocol).

2.2.1.3.1 GPRS
While GPRS [11][5] is based on the GSM radio interface, it improves on GSM by
using packet-switching, instead of circuit-switching. It also provides the ability to
exchange longer messages, shorter set-up time for ISP connections, higher data rates,
and the possibility for operators to charge by the amount of data that is sent rather
than the connection time. The data transmission rate is faster then GSM, because
GPRS phones can use multiple timeslots on the network. GPRS provides data rates of
56 up tol 14kbps and a continuous connection to the Internet.

It can be used for services such as SMS (Short Message Service), MMS (Multimedia
Messaging Services) and Internet communication services such as emails and WWW
(World Wide Web) access.

The security for GPRS is very similar to GSM; it contains the same three security
features. However, each security feature has been slightly improved. The anonymity
uses a Temporary Logical Link Identifier (TLLI) instead of the TMSl. The procedures
for authentication are executed from the SGSN (Serving GPRS Support Node) instead
of the MSC (Mobile Switching Centre) and for user data and signalling protection, a
modified version of the A5 algorithm, called GPRS-A5, is used.

The majority of attacks that can be used on GSM networks can also be used on GPRS
networks. In 2003 Elad Barkan, Eli Biham and Nathan Keller used ciphertext-only
cryptanalysis to crack A5, which is used on GPRS networks [12]. The security
provided by GPRS is still fundamentally quite basic.
2.2.1.3.2 WAP
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is a standard for presenting and delivering
information over wireless networks. It was developed by the WAP forum, which is a
group, founded by Nokia, Ericsson, Phone.com and Motorola [13] and was first
released in

1999. It is an application environment and contains a set of

communication protocols for wireless devices. It is optimised for low-bandwidth,
low-memory, low-display capability environments, such as mobile devices like
PDA’s and Smart phones.

WAP is used to access the Internet from a WAP micro browser, on limited devices. It
uses its own Mark-up Language WML (Wireless Mark-up Language), which is the
WAP equivalent of HTML. This is used to create mobile Internet sites, or WAP sites.
In 2001 there were more than 5 million WAP pages and several hundred thousand
WAP developers worldwide [14].

The security that is used in WAP is WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) this is
the wireless equivalent of SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). By default WTLS includes the
usage of ECC [15]. It is used to secure the communication between a mobile device
and other parts of the WAP architecture. WTLS is only used on the WAP architecture,
so it does not provide an end-to-end security mechanism. When the data, which is
using WTLS, hits the edge of the WAP architecture or the WAP gateway, the gateway
needs to open an SSL session straight away to continue on the transaction. The main
security issue with this approach is that someone could access the data as it is passing
from WTLS to SSL.

WAP enabled
browser
SSL

WTLS

Figure 2-1: WAP Architecture

2.2.1.4 Third-Generation Mobile Systems
The evolution towards 3G systems was driven by the need for higher capacity, faster
data rates and better Quality of Service (QoS). It was also designed to resolve
incompatibilities between standards, in order to allow mobile users to roam
worldwide, between different systems, without encountering any problems. 3G
networks provided data rates of up to 2Mbps [16] and included new services, such as
wide-area wireless voice telephone, video calls, and broadband wireless data in all
mobile environments.

The main 3G technology is UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System).

2.2.1.4.1 UMTS
UMTS, also known as 3GSM, is based on the GSM communication standards. I'his
design allows it to work in parallel with GSM, which means that it can be used in
areas where UMTS has not yet been fully implemented. However, UMTS
distinguishes itself from GSM by using different frequency bands. UMTS provides a
wide range of broadband services to mobile devices, such as delivering pictures,
graphs and video communications while also dealing with voice and data
transmissions [17].

As UMTS gains in functionality and credibility, it is becoming the industry standard.
By 2010, it is expected to have an annual revenue of more than $300 billion [18].

As UMTS is based on GSM it contains some of the same security features. However,
it improves on them and adds a few new features. It increases the key size from 64bits to 128-bits, uses stronger encryption algorithms, enhanced authentication and
adds data integrity protection to ensure that its security level is greater than that of
GSM [19]. However, the security provided is still at the network level and is not
totally end-to-end.
2.2.1.5 Fourth-Generation Mobile Systems
4G, also known as beyond 3G, is the term used to describe the next step in wireless
communication. Although 3G has not been fully implemented yet, leading companies
are currently working on 4G and are planning to implement it sometime between
2008 and 2015. At the moment there is no formal definition for 4G but there are
certain objectives proposed. These include having greater data speed from at least
100Mbps to IGbps [20], to take full advantage of broadband and high-performance
application like multimedia, wireless teleconferencing, and high security. It will also
integrate wireless LAN’s, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, and Wide Area cell based
networks, such as 3G.

2.2.2 Wireless LAN
A Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) is an extension to or a replacement for a
fixed Wired LAN. It utilizes radio waves and/or microwaves to maintain
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communication within a LAN and typically uses wired protocols. WLANs are
generally short range, high-bandwidth networks that are primarily developed for data.
The IEEE 802.11 [21] specification defines the technology and standards used by
WLAN. These wireless standards specify an '‘over-the-air” interface between a
wireless device and a base station or access point. There are currently four
specifications in the 802.11 family: 802.11, 802.1 la, 802.1 lb and 802.1 Ig, and each
one of these uses the Ethernet protocol and the CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance) for path sharing.

Wi-Fi Enabled
Mobile Device

Access Point
Wi-Fi Enable
Laptop

Figure 2-2: WLAN Architecture

The most commonly used standard is 802.1 lb [22], which is also known as Wi-Fi or
Wireless Fidelity.
2.2.2.1

Wi-Fi

Wi-Fi operates using an unlicensed spectrum in the 2.4GHz band. WLANs support up
to 54 Mbps data rates, however the device must be within 100m of a base station. It is
possible to extend the distance of the connection by using multiple base stations.
WLANs are deployed in conjunction with a wired backbone to offer last-hundredmetre connectivity. Usually, the WLANs are implemented as part of a private
network. [24]

Wi-Fi enabled devices come with a small amount of security, in the form of Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) [23]. The aim of WEP
is to provide a level of privacy that is equivalent to a wired LAN, by using an RC4

stream cipher. However, RC4 has been proven to have a number of weaknesses that
enable it to be cracked in a matter of minutes [25]. WEP is still being used today, but
as a very low level of security. WPA was created to overcome the weaknesses of
WEP. It provides stronger data protection by using an AES-based encryption
algorithm as well as strong access controls and user authentication. This security
measure needs to be activated by the individual using the Wi-Fi enabled device,
which is not always done.

2.2.3 Personal Area Networks (PAN)
These are wireless networks that connect devices over short distances, of about 10
meters. This may seem like a very short range, but it allows a computer to connect
wirelessly to a nearby printer, or for a mobile phone to connect wirelessly to a hands
free set.

PANs do not contain a pre-existing network. The device establishes an ad-hoc
network when it is within range of the receiver and the network is dissolved when the
device passes out of range. The two most commonly used PANs are Bluetooth and
Infrared.
2.2.3.1

Bluetooth

Bluetooth is a wireless technology that enables different devices to communicate with
each other over a short distance. It was developed by Ericsson in the late 1990’s to be
used for short distance communication, approximately 10 meters, with relatively low
bandwidth 1-3Mbps and was designed for low-power network devices, such as
PDA's. The Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) [26][27], which was made up of
Intel, IBM, Nokia, Toshiba and Ericsson, was founded in 1998 to oversee the
development and introduction of Bluetooth technology. Currently more than 8,000
companies have joined the SIG.

Similar to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth uses the unlicensed spectrum in the 2.4GHz band.
However to avoid interference from other devices using this band, Bluetooth uses
frequency hopping. This divides the band into 79 channels of IMhz each, and allows
the Bluetooth device to change channels according to a pre-agreed pattern.
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Bluetooth provides three modes of security, between two devices: [27]
•

Non-Secure.

•

Service Level Enforced Security.

•

Link Level Enforced.

Devices and services used by Bluetooth can have different levels of security. Devices
have only two levels of security, trusted or untrusted, whereas services have three
levels of security:
•

Services that require authorization and authentication,

•

Services that require authentication only,

•

Services that are open to all devices.

2.2.3.2 Infrared (IrDA)
IrDA stands for the Infrared Data Association. It is a non-profit trade association,
which has over 160 members. These members represent companies that work in a
number of different areas, such as computer and telecommunications hardware,
software, components and adapters. It was established in 1993 to set and support
hardware and software standards, which create infrared communication links. The
Association's goal was to create an “interoperable, low-cost, low-power, halfduplex", serial data interconnection standard that could be implemented on a wide
range of applications and devices. [28]
IrDA was popular on mobile devices during the later 1990’s and early 2000’s. It is
still being used today; however it is being replaced with other wireless technologies,
such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, as they don’t need to use a direct line of sight to transfer
data. The IrDA standards do not specify any security measures.

2.3 Effect of Network Evolution on Security
Wireless networks and devices, like any technology, are continuously evolving and as
they evolve new security threats emerge. To combat these threats some form of
security is adopted in nearly all areas of wireless technology. For example, mobile
networks like 3G, adopt security methods such as encryption and authentication.
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However in some cases, such as WLAN, the security solutions available are often not
used by the individual users.

2.3.1 Mobile Cellular Networks
Security methods were first introduced in the second generation of mobile networks,
GSM. They were designed to provide user authentication and confidentiality in overthe-air interfaces by focusing on three main aspects, Authentication, Encryption and
Anonymity.

Authentication is used to prove that an authorized or approved person is trying to
access the network. Authentication is done by the use of a stream cipher
authentication

algorithm called A3. This is a challenge-response type of

authentication. Each mobile device is assigned a secret key, which is located on the
SIM. Only the mobile device and an Authentication Centre, which can be accessed by
the base station, know' the secret key. The base station initiates the authentication
process by sending a random 128-bit number, R to the device. The mobile device uses
the A3 algorithm, the secret key and R to generate a 32-bit encrypted number. This is
then sent back to the base station to be verified. The base station uses the secret key
provided by the Authentication Centre to determine if the mobile device's response is
correct [29]. If both responses match then the authentication is achieved and the
mobile device can access the network. Each mobile device contains a Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM) card, which includes the necessary keys and algorithms
needed in the authentication process.

Mobile Device

Base Station

Centre

Figure 2-3: GSM Authentication

Encryption is used to ensure the confidentiality of data, by altering it before it is
transmitted, so that no unauthorized person can understand it. GSM uses a stream
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cipher known as the A5 algorithm. This algorithm was originally kept secret; however
it was publicly released after a few years because of leaked information and attempts
to reverse engineer it. A5 works by using a Session Key (Kc), which is generated by
the mobile device and a specific 22-bit number for each data frame being sent, to
create a keystream. The same Kc is used throughout the transmission but the data
frame numbers will continually change, thus generating a unique keystream for every
frame. However A5 has a number of weaknesses that leaves it open to being cracked.
It was cracked in less than a second on a single PC with 128 MB RAM and two 73
GB hard disks. This was achieved by analysing the output of the A5/1 algorithm in
the first two minutes of the conversation [30].

Anonymity is used to protect the user’s identity and to make it hard to track the
location of a certain user. In order to do this a TMSI is used. The TMSI is sent to the
mobile device after the authentication and encryption procedures have taken place.
The mobile device responds by confirming it received the TMSI.

Despite the above features GSM still contains a number of weaknesses. These include
the facts that the cipher keys and the authentication data are transmitted in plaintext
across the network, the lack of confidence in the encryption algorithms due to their
small key size, and the fact that active attacks, such as base stations being
impersonated, are not addressed [18]. Also the security provided is terminated at the
base station, which leaves the rest of the network to provide security, whereas in
reality the rest of the network might be unprotected.

For the 2.5G networks, GPRS implements slight improvements to these security
features. Within the anonymity feature, a different temporary identity called
Temporary Logical Link Identifier (TLLI) is used. The TLLl contains a Routing Area
Identity (RAI), which is used to avoid ambiguities that are caused by duplicate TLLI.
The relationship between the TLLI and IMSI is held within a database in each SGSN.

The GPRS-A5 encryption algorithm is used for ciphering the data and signalling
during data transfer, instead of the A5 used by GSM. It uses the Logical Link Control
(LLC) layer, which operates on the Data Link layer of the OSI model and is optimised
for packet-data communication [31]. The GPRS-A5 is implemented on the SGSN,
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whereas the A5 is used on the BTS (Base Transceiver Station). As for the
authentication feature, the only improvement is that it is executed on the SGSN
instead of the MSC.

However, for the 3G mobile networks, UMTS has made a number of significant
improvements to the GSM and GPRS security features [19]. The first is to use mutual
authentication, which is a 2-way authentication procedure that allows both the mobile
device and the serving network to authenticate each other. This provides security
against false base stations. During the authentication a 128-bit integrity key (IK) is
generated. This key is used with the integrity function, F9, to ensure the signalling
messages between the user and the network have not been manipulated.

The GSM and GPRS encryption algorithms are limited to 64-bit keys. Although the
default GSM encryption algorithm, A5/1, contains some weaknesses, which means
that the key length used is slightly shorter [32]. UMTS increased the key size to 128bits and made the encryption algorithms public. By making the algorithm public
knowledge it becomes the subject of independent research, which can improve the
algorithm's security strength. The security provided by UMTS is terminated in the
Radio Network Controller (RNC), which is located closer to the core of the network
than the base station. The reason for this is the fact that a significant portion of all
links between the base station and the RNC are transmitted over unprotected wireless
links. The closer to the centre of the network that the security is terminated the more
secure the data being transmitted is.

2.3.2 WLAN
Over the past number of years WLANs have rapidly gained in popularity, making
WLAN access points available in many public areas as well as within businesses. The
main security issue with WLAN is the fact that all of the data, including personal data
such as credit card information, has to be broadcast over the airwaves, which are more
susceptible to eavesdropping than wired networks. In order to provide some level of
security WEP was introduced in 1999.
WEP is an algorithm that was designed to provide wireless security for users
implementing Wi-Fi. WEP uses a stream cipher, called RC4, which combines a 40-bit
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or a 104-bit WEP key and a 24-bit random number known as an Initializing Vector
(IV). It performs three security services:
•

Authentication - This is the primary goal of WEP and is used to verify the
identity of the communicating mobile device.

•

Confidentiality - This is the second goal of WEP and is intended to prevent data
being compromised from eavesdropping.

•

Integrity - This is to ensure that the information is not modified as it is being
transmitted.

However, WEP has a number of security weaknesses and has been cracked in less
than 60 seconds [33]. The vulnerability of WEP can be attributed to the following
four areas [26]:
•

The uses of static keys. As WEP does not provide any key management, a
number of users in a wireless network could potentially share the same key for
long periods of time, which is a well-known security vulnerability.

•

The IV in WEP is a 24-bit field sent in the clear text portion of a message. This
is considered to be a small field in cryptographic terms. As it is such a small
field, there is a guarantee that the IV will be repeated after a relatively short time
within a busy network. This means that hackers can record the network traffic
and determine the key stream.

•

The IV is a part of the RC4 encryption key. By combining the weakness of the
RC4 encryption algorithm with the fact that the hacker knows 24-bits of each
packet, this can lead to successful analytical attacks

•

WEP provides no cryptographic integrity protection.

Another issue with WEP is that it does not provide end-to-end security but only for
the wireless portion of the connection.
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Figure 2-4: WEP Security Architecture

In an effort to over come the security limitation of WEP, WPA was developed. It was
designed to work with existing Wi-Fi products that have been enabled with WEP.

WPA dramatically improved on the WEP encryption process, by using Temporal Key
Integrity Protocol (TKIP), and adding a concrete user authentication mechanism using
802.lx and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [34]. TKIP uses a hashing
algorithm to change the keys being used and adds an integrity-checking feature to
ensure that the key hasn't been tampered with, EAP is a framework that is used to
authenticate users, and 802.lx is a port access control protocol, which prevents full
access to the network before the authentication is completed. The combination of
these two mechanisms provides a dynamic key encryption and mutual authentication.

WPA was an attempt to quickly and proactively increase the level of security on Wi
Fi enabled devices, prior to the release of the soon-to-be-finished 802.1 li [23] or
WPA2 security standard and so is not a perfect solution to the WEP limitation.

The main improvement of WPA2 is the fact that it provides a new AES-based
algorithm
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Authentication Code Protocol) to replace the RC4 stream cipher, which was used for
both WEP and WPA. The AES-based algorithm CCMP is considered fully secure.
Other features of WPA2 are the reduced overhead in key derivation during the
authentication exchange, opportunistic key caching when roaming between access

points and pre-authentication with IEEE 802, IX Authentication Exchange before
roaming [34],

However, even with the improving security on Wi-Fi enabled devices, the security
still doesn’t tend to be used. While the number of protected wireless networks is
increasing, it is reported that one quarter to one-fifth of business wireless networks
remain unprotected [35],

2.4 Security
At present there are two main drivers that are impacting the security provided by
modern technology. These are:
1. Significantly more corporate and private business is being performed over the
Internet. It is essential that any personal data being transmitted stays private and
cannot be intercepted by an unauthorized person.
2, Mobile devices are increasing in popularity. Portable devices are more likely to be
stolen or lost, which means that an unauthorised person can easily access any
private data stored on the device.
The most commonly used encryption schemes are AES, which is a symmetric
algorithm, RSA and a relatively new algorithm ECC, which are both asymmetric
algorithms. An overview of these algorithms will be discussed in this section and their
suitability for implementation on wireless mobile networks will be outlined.

2.4.1 AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was published in 2001, by the NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology)[36] and was adopted by the US government to
protect sensitive information. AES is rapidly becoming one of the world’s most
popular symmetric algorithms.

It is a symmetric block cipher and can use one of three different key lengths, which
are 128-bits, 192-bits and 256-bits. As AES is a block cipher, it takes in a block of
data to encrypt, which has to be a certain size, usually 128-bits and produces a
corresponding output block of ciphertext, which is the same size. This transformation
requires a second input, called a secret key, which can be any length. In order for this
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algorithm to work the secret key must be kept private. AES is a substitutionpermutation network algorithm, which makes it very strong and hard to crack [36].

However, since it is a symmetric algorithm, both parties involved in the data
exchange must share the same secret key. This means that the secret key has to be
transmitted over an unsecured channel, which can jeopardize the security of the
algorithm if an unauthorized person can access the secret key.

AES is a fast algorithm in both software and hardware, it is relatively easy to
implement and requires little memory. Although AES has certain weaknesses, like
needing to exchange the secret key, it is still an ideal candidate to be implemented on
limited devices, such as PDA’s.

2.4.2 RSA
RSA was developed in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [37], and was named
after their initials. It is a public-key or Asymmetric cryptography and can be used for
both encryption and digital signatures. RSA is the most widely used public key
cryptography system in the world, and it is widely used in e-commerce protocols [8].
It is believed to be very secure, when using sufficiently long keys and using up-todate implementations.

Asymmetric algorithms use a key-pair, which contains a public and private key and
relies on it being computationally unfeasible to recover the private key from the
public key. Its security is based on the difficulty of factoring two large integers. This
means that it relies on the fact that it is easy to multiply two large prime numbers
together, to create the public key, but extremely difficult and time consuming to factor
them back from the resulting number, to give the private key. The larger the prime
numbers being used the more secure the algorithm is. The recommended minimum
key size for the commercial use of RSA is 1024-bits.

As asymmetric algorithms use key-pairs, no private information needs to be
transmitted over an unsecured channel. This makes RSA much more secure than
symmetric algorithms, such as AES. However the larger the key sizes being used, the
more computationally intensive the key generation and encryption processes are. As
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the RSA algorithm uses key sizes that are equal to or bigger than 1024-bits, devices
executing it require a large amount of memory and processor power. This means that
it is not very suitable for devices with limited resources, such as PDA’s [38],

2.4.3 ECC
In 1985, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was proposed, independently, by Victor
Miller [39] and Neal Koblitz [40], It is a public-key algorithm. ECC is increasing in
popularity and has recently been endorsed by the US government [41],

ECC is based on complex mathematics that involves using points on an elliptic curve
in a finite field. There are two main finite fields that are used for ECC: GF (P), which
uses a prime number or GF (2), which uses a power of a prime number. As finite
fields, which are modular, are used to generate the key pair for ECC, it is considered
to be a very secure encryption algorithm.

However, ECC’s security relies on the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), in the same way that RSA depends on the difficulty of
factoring the product of two large primes. ECDLP states that it should be very
difficult to calculate the private key, when the generator point and the public key are
know.

ECC has been proposed as an attractive security method for mobile or wireless
environments. This is because ECC offers the same level of security as RSA but using
much smaller key sizes, for example a 160-bit ECC key is equivalent to a 1024-bit
RSA key. This could result in faster computations, lower power consumption,
memory and bandwidth savings, all of which could make ECC ideal for limited
devices, such as PDA’s and other mobile devices.

2.5 Previous Literature on Mobile Security
Most mobile devices, by default, are not protected against malicious hackers, which
mean that it is the user’s responsibility to provide some form of security. However,
there are a number of issues that must be taken into account when implementing
security on limited devices, such as the size of the processor and the battery life.
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Some of these issues or challenges are illustrated in the paper “Securing mobile
appliances: new challenges for the system designer” [42].

One of the most fundamental ways to protect a mobile device is to implement
Subscriber Identity Module Personal Identification Number (SIM Pin) and device
based power-on password, which are described in the paper “Profiling Through a
Digital Mobile Device” [43]. However, these methods do not protect the private data
that is stored on the device. In order to do this some form of encryption is needed.

Most symmetric algorithms, such as AES, DES or RC4, can be implemented on
small, mobile devices with little or no trouble. An example of this is the
implementation of a 128-bit AES algorithm on a smart card, which is discussed in the
paper “IT security project: implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) on a smart card” [44].

Another way to implement certain cryptography

algorithms, which can reduce the processing time and energy consumption while
maintaining a certain level of security, is to use two different types of symmetric
algorithms together. The “EMCEM: An Efficient Multimedia Content Encryption
Scheme for Mobile Handheld Devices” paper [45], implemented a form of selective
encryption which involved encrypting certain parts of the message with one algorithm
and using another algorithm for the other parts. In this case, a block cipher, AES and a
stream cipher, RC4, were used to encrypt the separate parts of the multimedia
message. However, RC4 is known to be a very weak algorithm that can be cracked
easily [46]. This means that if this approach was used to encrypt private data, certain
parts of ciphertext could be cracked and read relatively easily by a hacker, thus
reducing the security level.

Although most symmetric algorithms can be implemented on both mobile and
stationary devices, most asymmetric algorithms can only be implemented, efficiently,
on stationary devices. The “An Authentication Protocol for Mobile Devices” paper
[38] examined the implementation of a number of symmetric algorithms and an
asymmetric algorithm, RSA, on mobile devices. It determined that the RSA algorithm
is too slow and expensive for use on limited mobile devices, wheras the symmetric
algorithms performed very well on the same devices. The 2007 “Fast Firmware
Implementation of RSA-Eike Security Protocol for Mobile Devices” [47] paper also
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stated that RSA and RSA-based algorithms could take too long to perform the
encryption/decryption processes on mobile devices, thus making it unsuitable for
mobile devices.

However, not all asymmetric algorithms are just suitable for stationary device. ECC is
becoming a very popular asymmetric algorithm that can be implemented on both
stationary and mobile devices with resource limitations. The “Elliptic Curve
Cryptography on a Palm OS Device” paper [48] proved that ECC could be
implemented efficiently on a PDA. However, within this paper the ECC algorithm
was implemented using C, not Java, which means that the code/application will have
limited portability. This is because the C programming language was not designed to
allow applications to be executed on a range of environments, like Java was. This
paper also only examined the implementation of the GF (2"') finite field and did not
examine data transfer.

This thesis will look at the areas that are missing from these papers, such as:
•

Which finite field, GF (p) or GF (2"') performs better on limited devices?

•

How different types of networks affect the transfer of encrypted data?

•

How to maximize the portability of ECC, using Java?

2.6 Conclusion
In the past 25 years personal communication networks have evolved from fixed wired
networks to wireless mobile networks. They have adapted to the needs of the
customers, from a simple network providing wireless voice services to a complex
network providing wireless voice, data and multimedia services. As customers
demand new services from their mobile devices, such as wireless teleconferencing,
wireless networks will continue to evolve and improve.

With the advance of wireless networks, the use of mobile devices for personal and
corporate business, over the Internet, is increasing in popularity. There are currently
certain security measures available on wireless networks already, such as WTLS,
A3/A5, WEP and WPA, however these security methods have a number of limitations
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and weaknesses. This means that new encryption algorithms will be needed to
improve the wireless network security. AES and ECC are two encryption algorithms
that can be used to increase the security for data being stored on the mobile device
and/or being transmitted across a wireless network.

AES is already being introduced into emerging algorithms and protocols, such as
WPA2. This will increase the level of security over wireless networks but it will still
have the security weakness of transmitting the secret key across the network. To
increase the level of security over wireless networks dramatically and eliminate the
weaknesses of AES, an asymmetric algorithm is needed and ECC is emerging as an
ideal candidate. This is because ECC uses small key sizes, which means that
encryption computation is faster, there is lower power consumption, less memory and
bandwidth used, when compared to RSA. However end-to-end security is often not
provided on wireless networks, even with the implementation of improved encryption
algorithms.
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Chapters: Cryptography
3.1 Introduction
With the advance and widespread use of both mobile and wired technologies, security
weaknesses have been identified and used maliciously by hackers. In order to protect
the data from hackers, cryptography can be used.

Cryptography ensures that only an authorised person can read the private data. This
means that even if the hacker is able to retrieve the data, they will not be able to
understand it and so will spend a lot of time and effort deciphering it.

fhere are two types of cryptography, symmetric and asymmetric. Each has its own
security features, weaknesses and strengths. They can be implemented on either the
device storing the data or across the network. However, only certain types of
cryptography algorithms can be implemented on both wired and wireless networks,
such as AES.

This chapter will examine both types of cryptography, focusing on the most common
symmetric algorithm AES and the relatively new asymmetric algorithm ECC.

3.2 Cryptography
Cryptography is the science of changing data so that it is unrecognisable and useless
to an unauthorised person. It is necessary when communicating private data over any
insecure medium, which can include almost any network and the Internet.
Cryptography enables two or more people to communicate with each other in such a
way that only the intended authorised recipient can read the message [49]

A cryptographic algorithm, or cipher, is the mathematical function that is used to
encrypt or decrypt data [50]. Encryption is the process of converting plain text into a
non-readable format called ciphertext, whereas decryption is the process of converting
ciphertext back into plaintext.
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A cipher works in combination with a key, which is a special password made up of a
random string of characters. To ensure the security of the cipher, the key should only
be known by authorised individuals. Different ciphers use different size keys, for
example AES can use a key length of 128-bits, 192-bits or 256-bits whereas RSA can
use keys of length 1024, 2048 or above.

The security of the encrypted data depends on two things, the strength of the cipher
and the secrecy of the key [50]. Generally the more complicated the mathematical
function being used for the cipher the better. This is because the more complex the
maths is behind a cipher, the more computationally intensive it is to work out and the
more time it will take to be cracked. Generally, the larger the keys being used with the
cipher, the more secure the cipher will be against brute force attacks. If the key is
known, then the data can be encrypted or decrypted in a matter of seconds or minutes.
However, if the key is not known, and needs to be guessed, then the bigger the key is,
the longer it will take to work it out. If the size of a key is n-bits then there are 2"
possible keys. As n increases, the number of possible keys grows extremely rapidly.
For example,

if a relatively small 40-bit key was used there would be

1,099,511,627,776 possible keys but if a 128-bit key was used, that would offer an
extra

88-bits

to

the

key

length

which

would

be

an

extra

2^^

or

309,485,009,821,345,068,724,781,056 possible keys.

There are two different types of cryptography, symmetric and asymmetric; both are
explored in this thesis.

3.2.1 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric cryptography is also known as secret key cryptography. This form of
cryptography has been around for thousands of years. Julius Caesar is credited with
creating one of the earliest cryptographic systems, in 50-60 BC, in order to send
secure military message to his generals.

Symmetric cryptography involves the use of only one secret key for both encryption
and decryption. Only the parties involved in the message exchange should know the
secret key.
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Prior to exchanging any data, both parities have to agree on and exchange a secret key
over a secure channel. This can be expensive and awkward to do. However once the
secret key has been exchanged, data can be encrypted and decrypted.

Secret key

Plain Text

Cipher Text

Plain Text

Figure 3-1: Symmetric Cryptography

The two main types of symmetric cryptography are Block cipher and Stream cipher.
3.2.1.1

Block Cipher

Block ciphers divide plaintext into fixed size chunks, typically of size 64-bits or 128bits. In order to encrypt a block cipher wile take a block of plaintext, for example a
128-bit block and output the corresponding block of ciphertext. The secret key
controls this process. Decryption works in reverse. However in order to encrypt data
that is longer than the block size, in this case 128-bit, a mode of operation is used.
These include Electronic codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) and Cipher
Feedback (CFB).

ECB is the simplest mode, which just encrypts each block of plaintext, in succession,
using the same secret key. CBC uses a bitwise XOR to combine each plaintext block
with the previous ciphertext block, before encrypting it. This makes certain attacks
harder to perform, as an extra level of complexity is added to the cipher. In order to
start the encryption process an initial chaining value (ICV) is used to be XORed with
the first plaintext block. The CFB mode is very similar to the CBC mode. It works by
encrypting the previous ciphertext block and uses the exclusive-OR to combine the
output with the next plaintext block in order to produce the current ciphertext block.
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Again an ICV is used to start the encryption process. In order to be useful, a mode
must be at least as secure and as efficient as the underlying cipher [51].

Examples of block ciphers are AES, which can use a block size of 128-bits, and DES,
which uses a block size of 64-bits.
3.2.1.2 Stream Cipher
Stream ciphers encrypt plaintext one bit or byte at a time. To encrypt a stream of
plaintext, it is XORed with the pseudorandom cipher bit stream, known as the
keystream or the secret key. Decryption works in reverse. The keystream can be
generated either independently from the plaintext or ciphertext, which is called
synchronous stream cipher, or it can depend on the data and its encryption, which is
called self-synchronizing. Most stream ciphers are independent synchronous stream
ciphers [52].

The security in this method is by making the key stream hard to guess rather than
making the algorithm complex. It is designed to be exceptionally fast, much faster
than a block cipher. An example of this is the A5, which is used to encrypt GSM
communications.

Symmetric Cryptography algorithms, such as AES, are generally much less
computationally intensive than asymmetric cryptography. Because of this they are
suitable for processing large streams of data and are typically very fast. However they
are less secure than asymmetric algorithms, as someone could intercept the secret key
as it is being transmitted.

3.2.2 AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric cryptography algorithm. In
1997, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a search for a
replacement cryptography algorithm to Data Encryption Standard (DES) and in 2001
AES was selected [36][53]. AES uses the Rijndael algorithm, which was developed
by Joan Daemon and Vincent Rijmen [54]. Over the years AES has become one of the
most popular symmetric block cryptography algorithms.
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AES is capable of using three different key sizes; 128-bits, 192-bits, and 256-bits to
encrypt and/or decrypt data that is arranged in blocks of size 128-bits. The reason it
can use different size keys is because it is byte-oriented; this means that each block of
data is split into an array of bytes. The AES algorithm is based on rounds, which
contain either permutations or substitutions. Permutations rearrange the data, whereas
substitutions replace one unit of data with another unit. The number of rounds
performed is based on the key size, a 128-bit key uses 10 rounds, 192-bit key uses 12
rounds and 256-bit key uses 14 rounds.

The round function consists of four layers. The first layer uses a substitution box,
called S-box, to replace each byte with another according to an AES specific lookup
table. The next two layers are linear-mixing layers, which means that the rows within
the array of data, except the top one, are shifted cyclically and the columns are
transformed using a mathematical function. The last layer XOR’s each byte of the
array with the sub-key, which is derived from the key using a key schedule. The key
schedule algorithm calculates a sub-key, from a given secret key. Within the last
round, the column mixing is omitted. [53]

AES can provide very high levels of security, as it was specially designed to resist
some of the most sophisticated cryptographic attacks, such as time analysis and power
analysis. It also has very low memory requirements, which can make it ideal for
limited devices, such as PDA’s.

However, like all symmetric cryptography it has one major weakness, the fact that
both parties have to exchange the key over a possibly insecure channel.

3.2.3 Asymmetric Encryption
Asymmetric cryptography is also known as public key cryptography. Diffie and
Helllman proposed the concept of public-key cryptography in 1976 [55], with a
protocol that allowed two users to exchange a secret key over an insecure medium
without any prior secrets.

It works by using two separate keys, a public key for encryption and a private key or
secret key for decryption. Once the key pair is created, the public key is published
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while the private key remains secret. This means that anyone can encrypt a message
using the public key but only the person holding the private key can decrypt the
message. The private key is always linked mathematically to the public key.

Plain Text

Cipher Text

Plain Text

Figure 3-2: Asymmetric Cryptography

Asymmetric cryptography is based on a mathematical operation that is easy to do in
one direction but extremely difficult to do in reverse. The relative difficulty of solving
the mathematical operation determines the security strength of the corresponding
cipher [55]. An example of this is factoring. This is when it is easy to generate a large
number from two given prime numbers. However when given the large number, that
is the product of two large prime numbers, it is very difficult to generate the two
correct prime numbers.

Asymmetric cryptography algorithms, such as RSA or ECC, allow people to
exchange messages securely even though they may have no pre-existing security
arrangements. All of the communication is done by the public key, which means that
the private key will never be transmitted over a potentially compromised network.
Because of this, the need to share secret information is eliminated, making
asymmetric cryptography much more secure than symmetric cryptography. This can
mean that in some cases the key pair can remain unchanged for an number of
sessions. An example of this is on-line banking [56].

Not only can asymmetric algorithms be used for encryption but they can also be used
for authentication. Authentication is the process of verifying that the data being
received comes from a trusted source.

This can be performed when one person

encrypts data using the private key and another person decrypts the ciphertext using
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the corresponding public key. If the ciphertext is successfully decrypted, then the
person that sent the ciphertext has been verified. However, public key authentication
will not be examined in detail within this thesis.

One of the drawbacks with asymmetric cryptography is that they can be much slower
than symmetric cryptography. This is because the cryptography algorithms that are
used are based on very complex mathematics which can be very computationally
intensive.

3.2.4 Hybrid cryptography
Both symmetric and asymmetric ciphers have their own advantages and
disadvantages. Symmetric ciphers are faster, with the ability to run as much as 1,000
times faster than asymmetric [57], where as asymmetric are more secure. In order to
make the most out of both of these advantages, hybrid cryptography can be used. This
is when multiple ciphers of different types arc used together.

One common approach is to create a secret key for a symmetric cipher and then
encrypt it via an asymmetric cipher using the recipient’s public key. The data that is
being sent is then encrypted using the symmetric cipher and the secret key. Both the
encrypted secret key and the encrypted message are sent to the recipient, where they
can decrypt the secret key using their own private key and then use the secret key to
decrypt the data.

3.3 Elliptic curve cryptography
ECC is a public-key or asymmetric cryptography method. In 1985, Victor S. Miller
[39] and Neal Koblitz [40], independently, suggested using Elliptic Curves for public
key cryptography and implementing an existing algorithm, Diffie-Hellman [55]. Over
time ECC has evolved into a mature public-key cryptography method, which is
becoming increasingly more attractive as an alternative to other cryptographic
options, such as RSA.

The main reason for this is the fact that it provides the same level of security using
much smaller key sizes. For example, a 256-bit ECC key offers the same level of
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security as a 3072-bit RSA key. Also ECC key sizes scale linearly, which increases in
security, whereas RSA does not. The rate at which the ECC key size increases is
relatively steady, ranging from an increase of 32 to 128-bits, whereas the rate that the
RSA key sizes increase is nearly double. This means that as key sizes increase the gap
between both systems will grow dramatically. The following table illustrates this.

ECC

RSA

160

1,024

224

2,028

256

3,072

384

7,680

512

15,360

Table 3-1: Difference between ECC and RSA key sizes for equal security

One reason that the ECC key sizes can be so small is because the fastest known attack
on ECC is much slower than the fastest known attack on RSA. This means that ECC
can offer equivalent security with smaller keys and much higher performance [58J.

ECC is based on an algebraic structure of Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields, which
will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Elliptic curves have a
characteristic that is very valuable for cryptography purposes; they are relatively easy
to perform but extremely difficult to reverse [59].

An elliptic curve is defined in a standard, two dimensional x, y Cartesian coordinate
system by either one of the following equations:

•

= x"' + ax + b

•

+ xy = x’ + ax~ + b

The equation that is used depends on the finite field being implemented.

32

Figure 3-3: Elliptic Curve

3.3.1 Finite Field
A Finite Field, also known as a Galois field, is a field that contains only a finite
number of elements. The arithmetic performed within a finite field differs from
standard integer arithmetic, by generating results from any mathematical operation
that are elements that are contained within the finite field, for example 2*3 = 6 (mod
4) = 2. Whereas the results generated from standard integer arithmetic can be any
integer value, for example 2*3 =6.

Finite fields used for ECC, are always either a prime number, GF (P), or a power of a
prime number, GF (2).

3.3.1.1.1 GF (p) Finite Field
This is called the Prime field of order p, where p is a prime, and is the set
GF (p) = {1, 2, 3,

, p-1}. An elliptic curve over GF (p) is defined as the set of points

(x, y) that satisfy the equation:

y^ = x^ + ax + b (mod p)

where

-i- 21b ^ 7^ 0, p > 3 [61], and P(a, b) are certain chosen numbers on the

curve. Each different value of (a, b) will give a different elliptic curve.

The prime number p is chosen in such a way that there is a finitely large number of
points on the elliptic curve to make the cryptosystem secure. SEC (Standards for
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Efficient Cryptography) specifies curves using a prime number p should range
between 112-521 bits [60].

This finite field uses modular arithmetic, which involves arithmetic between the range
of 0 and p-1. In whatever operation is being performed (addition, subtraction,
multiplication or division), if the number is outside of this range then the result is
wrapped back around so that it is in the range 0 and p-1.

For example, in addition:
Ifp = 23, a= 15, b = 20
a + b (mod p) = 15 + 20 = 35 mod 23 = 12
The result of 15 + 20 = 35 is outside the range of 0 and 22 (p-1), so it has to be
wrapped around until if s within the range. Subtracting p from the results does this.
3.3.1.1.2 GF (2"') Finite Field
This is called a characteristic 2 finite field with 2"' elements, where each element is a
binary polynomial of degree m. The equation used for GF (2"') is:

+ xy =

-I- ax^ + h

where b ^ 0. The elements of this field are bit string of length m. m is chosen in such
a way that there is a finitely large number of points on the elliptic curve to make the
cryptosystem secure. SEC specifies curves using a bit string of length m should range
between 113-571 bits. [60]

This finite field involves arithmetic of integer of length m-bits, and are considered to
be binary polynomials of degree m-1. In binary polynomials the coefficients can
either be 0 or 1, if it becomes bigger than 1 it can be reduced by using modulo 2.
There are two main operations used in this finite field, addition and multiplication.

Addition is implemented as a component-wise XOR. For example, if a = 1101
b = 0110 :-a + b-aXORb=1011.
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While the multiplication, needs to be carried out in two steps. The first is using
polynomial multiplication and the second is reducing the output by an irreducible
binary polynomial f(x) of degree m. An irreducible binary polynomial means that it
cannot be factored as a product of binary polynomials each of degree less than m. For
example, if a = 1011 b = 1001

Step 1: a*b=1010011 Step 2; 1010011 mod f(x) =

0101 [72]

GF (2) is more efficient in hardware than GF (p), as it is represented as a bit-string
of length m and in terms of hardware; a bit-string representation of integers provides
greater ease of implementation than the natural representations of integers [52].
3.3.1.2 ECC Domain Parameters
Domain parameters specify the elliptic curve and the base point, G, which is to be
used and must be agreed upon by both parties prior to generating key pairs. The
domain parameters depend on the type of finite field being used.
3.3.1.2.1 ECC Domain Parameters over GF (P)
Elliptic curve domain parameters over GF (P) are a sextuple:
{p, a, b, G, n, h}
Where p is the prime number, and (a, b) are the parameters defining the equation. G is
the generator point (yT(.,T(.), which is a publicly know base point on the elliptic curve
that is used for the cryptographic operations, n is the smallest positive prime such that
nG = 0, and h is the co-factor where h =# E{F^)!nM E{Fis the number of points
on an elliptic curve [61].
3.3.1.2.2 ECC Domain Parameters over GF (2)
Elliptic curve domain parameters over GF (2) are a septuplet:
(m, f(x), a, b, G, n, h}
Where m is an integer defined for the finite field 2, f(x) is the irreducible
polynomial of degree m which is used for the elliptic curve operation [61]. The rest
are the same as above, section 3.3.1.2.1.
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3.3.1.3 ECC Key pair
ECC generates a key pair, which is made up of a public and a private key, through the
properties of the elliptic curve equation being used. The public key is a point on the
curve and the private key is a random number. In order to obtain the public key, the
private key is multiplied with the generator point G.

It is very easy to create a new point on the curve, the public key Q, by multiplying an
existing point G with a random number, such as the private key k. However, it is very
difficult to find k, even if you know G and the newly created point. One of the reasons
for this is the fact that finite fields are used. As finite fields are modular, the resulting
Q from G*k is modulated to produce an element that is within the finite field. So the
Q that is used for the public key is more than likely not the original value calculated.
This means that the ECC key pair is very secure.
3.3.1.4 ECC Operation
The main cryptographic operation in ECC is scalar point multiplication, this computes
the public key Q=kG. G is a point on the curve that is multiplied by k, which is an
integer, and produces another point on the curve Q. Scalar multiplication is performed
through a combination of point addition and point doubling. Point addition is the
addition of two points on a curve to obtain another point on the same curve. Point
doubling is the addition of a point on a curve to itself to obtain another point on the
curve. For example, 11P can be expressed as 11 P = (2((2(2 P)) + P)) + P [62].
3.3.1.5 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
The security of ECC depends on the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Computing the ECDLP is much harder than factoring
integers, which means that the level of security offered by ECDLP is greater than
factoring schemes like RSA. Also because ECC doesn’t contain a sub-exponential
time algorithm, smaller parameters can be used. This means that there is an increase
in the computational speed. ECDLP is also more resilient to future improvements in
computer hardware, assuming there are no significant improvements in the efficiency
of algorithms for solving ECDLP. [63]
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ECDLP states that it should be hard to find the private key k, when the generator
point, G, and the public key Q are known. The easier ECDLP is, the quicker an
unauthorized person can calculate the private key. This means that the difficulty of the
ECDLP is critical to the security of the ECC schemes [64]. It is believed that by using
large prime numbers, the ECDLP will be difficult to computationally solve.

However there are certain elliptic curves that can produce substantially lower security
levels, these include: [65]
•

A group of curves called super-singular elliptic curve.

•

Elliptic curve modulo p that contains exactly p points.

•

Elliptic curve defined over a finite field with 2"' elements where m is not a
prime.

Fortunately, each of the above cases can be identified easily and so avoided.
3.3.1.6 Key Exchange
Before any ECC encryption algorithm can be implemented a shared secret key needs
to be generated. This shared secret key needs to be the same for both parties
communicating, for example Alice and Bob. It will be used for the encryption and
decryption process.
3.3.1.6.1 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (ECDH)
Diffie and Heilman describe a protocol where two people, Alice and Bob, can derive
and share a common secret key, over an insecure communications channel. This
secret key can then be used, in conjunction with a symmetric algorithm to encrypt and
decrypt the data.
In order to exchange the secret information, both Alice and Bob have to agree on a
publicly known base point G on the elliptic curve being used.

Both Alice and Bob need to generate a key pair. Alice generates a private key a and
Bob generates a private key b. Alice’s public key is
key is

O'"

mod p, whereas Bob’s public

mod p. The public keys are then exchanged and both Alice and Bob

generate a shared secret key using the other public key. Alice’s shared secret key is
(G^j^'mod p and Bob’s shared secret key is (G")^mod p.
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The following is a simple example to illustrate this, which is taken from “Introduction
to cryptography with coding theory” by Wade Trappe, Lawrence Washington [52]:

•

Alice and Bob agree to use p=7211 and G=(3,5)

•

Alice generates a random private key a=12, and a public key: G" mod p,
which is (1794, 6375) and is sent to Bob

•

Bob generates a random private key b=23 and a public key: G* mod p,
which is (3861, 1241) and is sent to Alice

•

Alice generates the shared secret key: (G*)"mod p = (1472, 2098)

•

Bob generates the shared secret key: (G")^mod p = (1472, 2098)

•

The shared secret key is then used to encrypt and decrypt the information.

Diffie-Hellman key exchange depends on the difficulty to calculate the shared secret
key given the two public keys when p is sufficiently large.

However, the problem with ECDH is its vulnerability to a man-in-the-middle attack.
This is when Eve, an external attacker, is able to read, insert or modify messages
between Alice and Bob without either person knowing.

For example within ECDH, Eve could be able to intercept Alice's public key,
substitute it for her public key and send her own public key to Bob. Then when Bob
transmits his public key. Eve substitutes Bob’s public key with her own public key
and sends it to Alice. This means that Alice and Eve will agree on one shared key and
Bob and Eve will agree on another. Both Alice and Bob are unaware that they are
communicating thought Eve, as they are able to encrypt and decrypt information
equally. Eve is able to decrypt messages sent by either Alice or Bob, then read and
possible modify the message before re-encrypting them with the appropriate key and
sending it to the other party. [42]
3.3.1.7 ECC Algorithms
ECC uses the finite field to create the key pair. However in order to encrypt and
decrypt two different algorithms, ECIES and a hybrid of ECC and AES, will be
implemented within this project.
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3.3.1.7.1 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
ECIES is a public-key encryption scheme based on ECC and Diffie-Hellman. It
combines Elliptic curve asymmetric encryption, a block cipher and a message
authentication algorithm. It is designed to be semantically secure against a chosenplaintext or a chosen-ciphertext attack. This is the most commonly used algorithm for
ECC encryption and decryption.

When Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob, Alice needs to know the
following information:

•

The cryptographic suite being used, which includes the following: (This will
be common to both Alice and Bob)
o

Key Derivation Function (KDF), this function creates the secret keys,
e,g, ANS1-X9,63-KDF with SHA-1 option

o

Message Authentication Code (MAC), this is a short pieee of data that
is used to authentieate a message e,g, HMAC-SHA-1-160 with 160-bit

o
•

Symmetrie Encryption Scheme e,g, 3-key TDES in CBC or AES

EC domain parameters being used, GF (P) = (/;, a, h, G, n, h) or else
a, h, G, n, h) (I'his will be common to both Alice and Bob)

GF (2"') =
•

Bob's public Key, B,

•

Optional shared information, such as signatures S and S2 •

When Alice wants to encrypt a message M, she does the following steps. The
following is taken from “PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices” [66]:
•

Generate a random, private key k, where k e [ 1, n-1 ]

•

Calculate the public key on the elliptic curve, by Q = kG

•

Calculate a shared secret 5*^ = P^, where P = (Px,Py) = kB and P^^^ 0

•

Use

I
•

KDF

to

drive

a

symmetric

encryption

and

a

MAC

key:

KDFiS, II .S.)

Encrypt the message M, where the Symmetric Encryption Scheme is
E: c-E (kE, M)
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•

Compute a tag of the encrypted message and .S',: d = MAC( k^\c\\

•

This outputs Q II c II d.

)

To decrypt the ciphertext. Bob needs the cipher text, private key Bpj.,and domain
parameters, and does the following. The following is taken from “PGP in Constrained
Wireless Devices [66]:
•

Calculates the shared secret

= Px, where P = (Px,Py)

and P^O

(This should be the same as the one Alice calculated because P == Bp^,Q =
B
•

kG = kB p^^ G = r B).

Calculate a symmetric encryption key and MAC key, the same way Alice did
k,\\ k,,=KDF(S,\\S,)

•

Use the MAC to check the tag and the output will fail if d

•

Then use the Symmetric Encryption Scheme, E, to decrypt the message

MAC(

;c || S^)

M=£-‘(yt,.,6*)
3.3.1.7.2 Hybrid - ECC/AES
This is a combination of ECC and AES. It uses ECC to create the key pair, generates
an AES shared secret key and uses the AES cipher algorithm to encrypt and decrypt.
This method combines the strength of ECC keys with the speed of a symmetric
algorithm.
Before any data can be exchanged both parties need to agree on the domain
parameters being used. Once this is done, both Alice and Bob create an ECC key pair.
This is done as follows:
•

Generate the private key, k where k g [ 1, n-1 ]

•

Calculate a point Q on the elliptic curve by Q = kG

The public key can then be exchanged and an AES shared secret key generated. A
form of DH, called Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Scheme Diffie-Hellman (ECKASDH), is used to generate the shared secret key. The ECKAS-DH creates a shared large
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integer S, which is then used to create the AES shared key. The shared secret should
be the same for both parties. To create the shared secret key the following is done,
•

Create a new point P on the elliptic curve by multiplying the private key k with
the other parties public key B; kB = P = (Px,Py) where P^^^: 0.

•

Creating a large integer S = P^, where P = (Px,Py)

•

Convert S into an AES shared key

When the AES shared key is created, which should be the same for both parties, data
can be encrypted and decrypted using this key. As AES is a block cipher, and a mode
of operation is needed, CEB is used. The process for performing the AES encryption
is outlined in section 3.2.2

3.4 Conclusion
ECC can be implemented over two different types of Finite Fields, GF (P) or GF
(2"'). The mathematical operations involved in these finite fields helps to generate
secure key pairs that contribute to the strength of the ECC ciphers.

ECC offers the highest strength-per-key-bit of any known public-key system. The
smaller key size results in smaller system parameters, smaller processors, bandwidth
savings, faster implementation and lower power requirements. For these reasons, ECC
is being suggested for limited devices and as an alternative to RSA.

This chapter has focused on cryptography, in particular ECC, discussed the operation
of ECC and the ECC encryption algorithms that are going to be implemented within
this research. The next chapter will outline the J2ME architecture that will be used for
the development and implementation.
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Chapter 4: J2ME Architecture
4.1 Introduction
Mobile devices have a number of resource constraints such as CPU, memory,
connectivity and battery limitations. This means that the development and run-time
environment, which will be used to create and execute the software that implements
ECC onto the mobile devices, needs to be specially designed to accommodate these
limitations. One of the most suitable environments to achieve this is Java 2 MicroEdition (J2ME) [67].

J2ME was specially designed to be a robust and flexible environment that could
execute Java applications on small mobile devices with resource constraints, such as
smart phones or PDA’s. It also includes a number of extra features such as user
interfaces, security and built-in network protocols.

Java-based mobile devices are increasing in popularity at a dramatic rate. In 2005, the
total number of deployed Java-based devices worldwide was 250 million. This
increased to around 1.2 billion in 2006 [68]. This is because Java, as a programming
language, enables developers to create a piece of code or application just once and
execute it on a large number of different sized devices without having to change or
modify it [69].

This Chapter outlines the architecture of J2ME, the network connections that enable
the software to transmit data across wireless networks, and a technique to reduce the
size of the Java applications, which helps to improve performance.

4.2 Java Platforms
Java is a high-level, object-oriented programming language which was developed by
Sun Microsystems in the mid 1990’s. The first version of Java was released in 1996,
in the form of the Java Development Kit 1.0 (JDK 1.0). JDK 1.0 included
development tools, such as the Java compiler, the Java runtime. Virtual Machine
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(VM) and class libraries. Sun later provided a separate runtime-only package, called
Java Runtime Environment (JRE) [70].

During the development of Java 1.2, it was decided to make major changes in the way
Java was packaged and licensed. This meant that Java 1.2 became Java 2 and the Java
platform was split into three editions: Standard Edition, Enterprise Edition and Micro
Edition. Each of these platforms contains the language version, set of standard
libraries. Application Programming Interfaces (API) and a VM, which is used to
exeeute the code.

Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) was released with the tag line “Write once, run
anywhere” [75]. The original idea behind J2SE was to create a programming language
that allowed developers to write code once and execute it on any platform, such as a
desktop or workstation, which supported a Java Virtual Maehine (JVM).

After two years another version of Java, Java 2 Platform Enterprise Edition (J2EE),
was released. This version was intended for developing and deploying on much larger
devices than desktop machines such as multi-tier enterprise applications and has
support for Servlets, JSP and XML built-in.

The next edition is Java 2 Micro-Edition (J2ME), which was released in June 1999.
This version was intended for devices with limited memory, display, processing
power, network bandwidth and battery life, such as PDA's. Like all Java applications
J2ME allows programmers to write eode once and implement it on a wide range of
devices. These applications can be downloaded dynamieally and utilise each device’s
native capabilities [73].
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Figure 4-1: Java Platforms

4.3 J2ME
Java ME is a slimmed-down version of J2SE and is aimed at devices with resource
constraints, such as devices with as little as 128Kb of RAM. Using J2ME developers
are able to produce portable code that can be run on multiple devices. These devices
can range in size from small mobile phones and PDAs to set-top boxes that are Just
short of being desktop PCs [69].

J2ME was introduced to address the special need of devices that were outside the
scope of J2SE and J2EE. In order to enable J2ME applications to run efficiently on
these devices a number of standard API components have been removed from the
core Java platform.

4.3.1 J2ME Architecture
Although mobile devices have a number of things in common, such as memory and
battery constraints, they also have a number of differences such as form, function and
features. In order to address these differences, J2ME supports a flexible architecture
that is both modular and customisable. It consists of a variety of configurations,
profiles and optional API's that represents the characteristics of the supported devices.
These elements are implemented on top of the mobile device’s Operating System.
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Figure 4-2; Java Architecture

4.3.1.1

Configuration

The configuration element of the J2ME architecture provides a complete Java runtime
environment and consists of a JVM, the Java language features and core libraries of
the JVM. Due to the large range of mobile devices on the market J2ME defines two
different configurations: Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) and
Connected Device Configuration (CDC) [74]. Since J2ME is a slimmed-down version
of J2SE, CLDC and CDC have certain functionalities that are inherited from J2SE.
The following figure shows the relationship between CLDC, CDC and J2SE.

Figure 4-3: Relationship between J2ME and J2SE
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The classes that CLDC and CDC inherit are either exactly the same or a subset of the
corresponding class in J2SE. However, both also introduce a number of features and
classes that are created specifically to address the needs of small-footprint devices
[75]

The configuration that is used is based on the device’s limitation, such as memory,
display, processing power and network connectivity etc.
4.3.1.1.1 CLDC
CLDC targets low-end devices, with limited amounts of memory and/or slow
processors. It has the following characteristics [75]:
• Very simple user interface.
• 160 - 512 Kb memory.
• 16 or 32 bit processor.
• Limited power, usually battery operated.
•Network connectivity, typically wireless, with low bandwidth.
•Contains a small fraction of the J2SE core libraries, just java.lang, Java.io and
java.util.
• A Small JVM called K Virtual Machine (KVM) is supported.
• Examples: Mobile phone, or PDA
4.3.1.1.2 CDC
CDC targets high-end devices and has the following characteristics [75]:
• Large range of user interface capabilities.
•Minimum of 512 Kb read-only-memory (ROM).
• Minimum of 256 Kb random access memory (RAM).
• 16 or 32 bit processors.
•Network connectivity, possible persistent and high bandwidth.
• Contains a larger set of core libraries than CLDC.
• A full JVM is supported.
• Examples: TV set-top boxes.

46

4.3.1.1.3 Virtual Machines
One of the main reasons for the eonfiguration layer in the J2ME environment is the
fact that the core Java libraries are directly connected to JVM being used. This means
that if a configuration’s specification changes, even slightly, then the JVM design
needs to be modified. This can require a substantial amount of additional memory
footprint. To over come this problem, a small number of configurations are
implemented which means that a small number of JVM’s can look after a large range
of devices with different hardware and a large number of profiles [71]. As there are
two configurations two VMs are need, which are JVM and KVM.
The JVM is an abstract computer that runs Java applications. As Java applications
need a JVM to be executed, a JVM must be implemented on the platform running the
Java application. It is usually implemented through software, which is located on top
of a “real” hardware platform and operating system (OS). This provides a buffer
between the executed Java application and the underlying hardware platform and OS.
This buffer is essential to the portability of the JAVA application, as it enables it to be
executed on the JVM no matter what is underneath a particular JVM implementation
[71].

Compiled Java Programs
Java Virtual Machine
Hardware Platform and Operating System

Figure 4-4: JVM Architecture

KVM was released in 1999, as an entirely new Java runtime environment. It was built
to be an extremely lean implementation of the JVM, which is ideal for devices that
have a small memory footprint. It supports a small subset of the features provided by
JVM, for example it does not support floating-point operation. KVM is only 40K of
object code and needs only “a few tens of kilobytes” at runtime. It is suitable for
16/32-bit RISC/CISC microprocessors with a total memory budget of no more than a
few hundred kilobytes (and sometimes less than 128 kilobytes), because of this it is
the core of the CLDC configuration [76].

47

4.3.1.2 Profile
Profiles were introduced to cover the capabilities of a wide range of mobile devices,
while at the same time being flexible. Profiles are built on top of the J2ME
configuration and address certain demands within a particular device family. It also
defines specific API libraries and requirements that are needed to develop
applications for a certain device. In order to use a profile, the device has to meet the
minimum requirements of the configuration and any additional requirements that are
demanded by the profile’s formal specification [76].

There are several profiles available, while they depend on the configuration being
used. For example, a CDC-based profile is a Foundation Profile (FP), and a CLDCbased profile is a Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP).
4.3.1.2.1 MIDP
MIDP [86] defines the Java application environment for mobile information devices
(MID), such as mobile phones and PDA’s, which have resource limitations. It is based
on the CDLC configuration and its KVM. As it is built on-top of CFDC it has access
to all of its classes and functionality.

MIDP has the following minimal characteristics:
• A displays that is at least 96 pixels wide by 56 pixels high.
• A user input device such as keypad, keyboard or a touch screen
• Wireless network capability.

As it is a complete runtime environment, the mobile device is able to download
programs or applications, from a server, in the form of MIDlets.
4.3.1.2.2 MIDIet
A MIDIet is a J2MF application designed to run on mobile devices that complies with
a specific MIDP. Like other Java applications, it has the “compile once, run
anywhere” potential, which enables it to be implemented on a wide range of mobile
devices.
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MIDlets are made up of at least one class, which is derived from the
javax.microedition.midlet library. It is an event-based application and can exist in
four states, loaded, active, paused and destroyed. A MIDlet is in the loaded state as
soon as the constructor is called, which can happen at any time. Once it is in the
loaded state, the program manager can begin the MIDlet by calling the startAppQ
method. Next the program manager can call either the pauseAppQ method, which
pauses the MIDlet, or the destroyApp, which terminates the MIDlet [77].

Figure 4-5: The life cycle of a MIDlet

The basic components of any MIDlet application are the Java Archive (.jar) file and
the Java Application Descriptor (.Jad) file. The .jar file contains the JAR manifest,
classes file and support files, such as images and application data. The JAR manifest
is a text file that contains various attributes. It must contain the following six
attributes otherwise the .jar file will not be loaded:
• MIDlet-Name
• MIDlet-Version
• MIDlet-Vendor
• MIDlet-<n> for each MIDlet in the JAR file
• MicroEdition-Profile
• MicroEdition-Configuration
The .jad file is a text file that contains the location of the .jar file and a description of
its contents.
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4.3.1.3 Optional Packages
By adding various optional API packages to a configuration and an associated profile,
the J2ME platform can be extend. An optional package exposes speeific
functionalities that are not available in a profile. As these optional packages are
modular they can be included when a specific function is actually needed. This helps
to eliminate any unnecessary functionality, which can reduce the memory and
processor power needed by the device. These optional packages offer standard APIs
for existing and emerging technologies such as wireless messaging and Bluetooth. For
example, JSR 82: Java APIs for Bluetooth.

As APIs are developed for new technologies and features, the new APIs are initially
developed as optional packages. However, as those APIs mature and new versions are
created, optional packages can be incorporated into a profile.

An optional package being used within this project is JSR 177: Security and Trust
Services API for .I2ME. This specification extends the security features for the J2ME
platform, by adding cryptographic APIs and digital signature service.

4.3.2 Network Connection
Since J2ME can be implemented on a wide range of mobile devices, which have a
number of different networking capabilities and different file I/O (Input/Output)
requirements, it has to provide a flexible networking operation. In order to do this, the
Generic Connection Framework (GCF) was introduced. GCF is able to support a wide
range of mobile devices, as it defines a very general abstraction of networking and file
I/O. The abstractions are defined as Java interfaces. There is one class, called the
Connector, and 7 connection interfaces, which are shown in Figure 4-6. These can be
found in the Javax.microedition.io package.
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Figure 4-6: Generic Connection Framework

The 7 connection

interfaces define the abstractions of 6 basic types of

communications:
• Basic serial input.
• Basic serial output.
• Datagrams communications.
• Sockets communications.
• Notification mechanism in a client-server communication.
• Basic Web server connection.
The Connector class is the core of the GCF; this is because all of the connection
interfaces are created by the static method '‘open”, which is defined in the Connector
class. Different types of network communication can be created using the same
method, only with different parameters. This design makes J2ME very flexible at
supporting new devices and produce [85].
The following is an example of opening a connection to a text file, which is located in
the “My Documents” folder.

File file = (FileConnection) Connector.open("file:///My
Documents/DecryptedMessage.txt");
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4.3.2.1

Sockets

Sockets are a TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)-based network connection. TCP
is a reliable protocol, which makes sure that the data packets are delivered and
received in the correct order. If the receiving end of the socket does not receive an
expected packet in a set time, then it is assumed lost and a request for the
retransmission of the packet is sent to the sender. The receiver will not move on to the
next packet until it has received the missing packet. The retransmission of lost or
damaged packets is automatically done as part of the Java operation.

A socket can be used to create a single network connection between two programs or
applications running on a network. If more than two programs or applications want to
communicate, then multiple sockets are needed.

To establish a socket connection between two programs or applications, a three-way
handshake is performed and a starting sequence number is exchanged. This sequence
number will increase in accordance with the amount of data being sent and received,
thus offering a reliable service. For example, if the initial sequence number is 1 and
512 bytes are being sent then the next sequence number will be 513. The three-way
handshake is outlined below in Figure 4-7
Client

Server

SYN
Src = Client_Port, Dest = Server_Port
Seqnum = 0
SYN_ACK
Src =Server_Port, Dest = Client_Port
Seq_num = 100 ack_num = 1
ACK
Src = Client_Port, Dest = Server Port
Ack num =101

Figure 4-7: Socket three-way handshake
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There are three steps involved in establishing a soeket connection between a client
and a server, these are:
• Stepl - The client initiates the socket connection, by sending the SYN
(SYNchronize sequence number) bit in the TCP header to the server. The
sequence number is set to 0, because it is the initial sequence number.
• Step2 - When the server receives the SYN bit, it sends back another SYN bit and
an acknowledgment message, SYN ACK, to the client. The server sends its initial
sequence number as 100 and its ACK number as 1. The ACK number signifies
that the server expects the next sequence number to be 1.
• Step3 - Once the client receives the SYN_ACK from the server, it finishes off the
three-way handshake by sending back an acknowledgment, ACK. The clients
ACK number is set to 101, which means that the next expected sequence number
to be received is 101. When the ACK is sent the client assumes that the
connection is established.

To perform the three-way handshake one of the programs or applications, usually the
server will listen for a connection request and the other, usually the client, will request
a connection. Socket connections are established by using the Connector class. The
following is an example of a client requesting a socket connection to a server, whose
IP address is 157.190.148.91 and is listening on the port 8080:

int PortNo = 8080;
String serveraddress = "157.190.148.91
String name = "socket://" + serveraddress + ":" + PortNo;
StreamConnection client = (StreamConnection) Connector.open(name);

The Java libraries that are implemented, within the application, handle this socket
connection.

Once a connection has been established, data can be transmitted in either direction. In
order to send or receive data across the socket an OutputConnection and an
InputConnection, respectively, have to be established, and an OutputStream and
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InputStream object is obtained to perform the write or read operations. Figure 4-8
illustrates the socket API.
Client

Server

Figure 4-8: Socket API

4.3.3 Obfuscator
Within J2ME, a compiled program can contain a lot of debugging information such as
source file names, field names, variable names and method names. This extra
information can make it very easy to decompile and reverse engineer the program. In
order to provide some level of security and to make it harder to reverse engineer, an
obfuscator is used. Obfuscation is the process of replacing all the names of variables,
classes and methods, within a Java program with meaningless gibberish.

With obfuscation it is possible to determine any element within the code that is not
needed, such as unused classes or methods. These elements can be then be removed,
which reduces the size of the applications. Certain obfuscator tools have reported as
much as a 70% reduction in the size of Java applications; however the normal
reduction rate is 25%-40% for most applications [78]. As these programs are smaller
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they tend to load faster and require less memory. The following table shows the size
of a few programs before and after they were obfuscated [78].
Project Description
Games
Obex
Demo
Web
service
client
Stock
Quote
Suite

Demo MlDlet Suite provided with
WTK 2.2
Demo of Object Exchange
provided with WTK 2.2
J2ME WS client from
http://www.devx.com/wireless/Arti
cle/28046
J2ME Stock Quote MIDlet demo
from
http://www.manning.eom/books/w
hite/source

Original
size
54.1K

After
Obfuscation
38.7K

Reduction

75.4K

70.7K

6.2%

11.2K

6.6K

41.3%

16.6K

11.3K

31.9%

28.5%

Table 4-1: Size of programs before and after obfuscation.

4.4 Conclusion
J2ME offers a great platform for developing programs or applications for mobile
devices with resource limitations. The J2ME architecture provides a number of
components, such as configuration, profiles, and optional API’s, which makes the
platform very flexible and easily implemented on a wide range of devices. The MIDP,
which is implemented on top of the CLDC configuration, is an ideal profile for
wireless mobile devices with limited memory, processing power, network bandwidth
and battery life, such as PDA’s.

Wireless networks are subjected to a wide range of interference, such as bad weather,
other wireless devices, or electrical devices, which can affect the transfer of data. In
order to prevent the '‘loss” of any data, a reliable protocol can be used. The network
connection used throughout this project is sockets, which are based on reliable
protocol TCP.

As mobile devices have a number of resource limitations it is important that any
program or application being implemented on them are as small as possible. In order
to achieve this obfuscation is used. This helps to reduce the size of the program,
which in turn helps to improve its performance on a limited device.
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This chapter has focused on the J2ME architecture, discussing the network connection
being used within this thesis and a technique to minimise the requirements of the
implementation of a program or application on a mobile device.
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Chapter 5: Implementation
5.1 Introduction
The research objective is to improve the security of mobile devices, by implementing
the two ECC encryption algorithms outlined in chapter 3. However a third encryption
algorithm, RSA, which is the standard asymmetric cryptography algorithm, has also
been developed and implemented. This was done in order to be able to compare the
performance of the two ECC algorithms with RSA. As there wasn’t a J2ME version
of RSA, which could be downloaded, it was developed and implemented.

The mobile devices being used were a laptop and a PDA, which have certain resource
limitations. The J2ME architecture, which was outlined in chapter 4, was used to
create the MIDlet programs. The development and implementation of the three
encryption algorithms will be explained in this chapter.

In order to implement the encryption algorithms across a wireless network, each
algorithm implementation contains a pair of MIDlets, which are made up of a client
and a server MIDlet. Each of these MIDlets, within the pair, is able to encrypt and
decrypt data that is read from a file and can communicate with each other by sending
and receiving plaintext and ciphertext.

The client MIDlet provided a simple user interface, which allows the user to select the
functionality that is preformed by the MIDlet. This includes generating a key pair and
selecting a message to be encrypted.

5.2 Implementation tools
In order to develop and implement the Java program, a number of tools were needed.
To develop the encryption algorithms on a desktop PC, a development environment
called NetBeans [79] was used. Sun Java Wireless Toolkit [80] was used to
implement the MIDlets on the desktop PC and the laptop. However, to implement the
client MIDlets on a PDA a different VM, called J9 IBM [81], was used.
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5.2.1 NetBeans
The development environment that was used to develop the Java encryption programs
was NetBeans IDE (Integrated Development Environment). NetBeans was used
because it is a free, open-source IDE, which is written entirely in Java and supports
the development of Java application types such as J2ME and mobile applications.

In order to add extra functionality to the NetBeans IDE, modules can be added. An
extra module, called the Mobility Pack, was used throughout this thesis to create the
MIDlets. This module was designed to write, test and debug applications for J2ME
enabled mobile devices, such as PDA’s.

When the initial encryption programs were created within NetBeans, there were a
number of different types of “projects” from the Mobility package. The ones that were
used were the “Mobile Class Library”, which was used for the MobileLibrary library,
and the “MIDP Application’', which was used to create the MIDlets. The functionality
of the MIDlets is explained in section 5.5 - Sequence of events.

5.2.2 Sun Java Wireless Toolkit
The Java wireless toolkit (WTK) is a toolbox that could be used to develop or
implement wireless applications that are based on J2ME's CLDC and MIDP. WTK
was used, on both the desktop PC and the laptop, to execute the MIDlets from their
.Jad file. The WTK used an emulator, which imitated the PDA, to implement the
MIDlet.
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Figure 5-1: Selecting a MIDIet using the WTK

5.2.3 J9
The PDA that was used did not have support for Java pre-installed, so an additional
Java VM needed to be installed. The NetBeans VM and WTK were too large to be
used on the mobile device, which meant that a smaller VM was required. The Java
VM that was used was J9, from IBM. It was chosen for the following reasons:

•

It provides a small-footprint embeddable solution for mobile devices.

•

Implements a J2ME runtime.

•

Supports CLDC version 1.1 and MIDP version 2.0.

•

Provides configuration options to optimise memory and performance.

•

Supports a number of operating systems such as Windows, Palm OS Cobalt,
Palm OS Garnet, Linux and Neutrino RTOS, so it can be used on a number of
different devices.

Before the MIDlets could be executed, J9 needed to be installed and the .jar and .jad
files for the client encryption MIDlets needed to be transferred to the PDA. The files
were transferred from the desktop PC to the PDA using a serial sync cradle.
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To implement a Ml Diet on the PDA, the MlDlet’s .jad file was declared in the J9
emulator.exe. The emulator.exe was used to execute the MlDlets and the .jad file was
used to identity the .Jar file and its contents, and thus execute the code. However J9
did not contain any method to access files, which were located on the PDA host
machine, so JSR-75: PDA Optional Packages for the J2ME Platform was added. The
.jar file from JSR-75 was placed in the J9 library folder and provided the capability to
access files located on the host machine.

As the PDA contained certain resource limitations, only one client encryption MlDlet
could be supported in the J9 emulator.exe at a time.

5.3 Third party libraries
CLDC contains four standard libraries; javax.microedition, which is specific to J2ME
and java.io,java.util, and java.lang, which are subsets of those specified in larger Java
editions, such as J2SE. However these libraries did not provide all of the functionality
required to build an encryption application, so a third party library was needed. The
library used was called Bouncy Castle Crypto.

Bouncy Castle is an open source, lightweight cryptography package that is designed
for Java platforms. It supports a large number of cryptography algorithms and is one
of the only complete cryptography packages that could be run on MIDP.

However, the main issue with implementing the Bouncy Castle library is that a
number of the required functionalities were missing from the library. As the library
was downloaded in the form of a .jar file, and that the .jar files could not be edited, a
new library was created especially for this project. This new library, called
MobileLibrary, is made up of 176 classes that contain both the missing and existing
functionality provided by the Bouncy Castle Crypto library. These classes include the
functionalities needed to create the key pairs and the encryption/decryption
algorithms. This library is included in all of the MlDlets.
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5.4 Network Connection
In order to transfer data across a network, two MIDlet’s are needed, a client and a
server. The client MIDlet was placed on the mobile device, whereas the server MIDlet
was placed on a powerful desktop. Both MIDlets were able to communicate with each
other, over wired or wireless networks, by using sockets.

5.4.1 Sockets
Before the client can initiate a socket connection, the server must be running and
listening on a certain port for a connection request. If the server MIDlet was not
executed first and listening on a port, then the client MIDlet would not have been able
to create a network connection and would have needed to be restarted.

The server used the open method from the GCF Connector class, to initial the socket
connection and the StreamConnectionNotifier, to listen for a socket connection
request on the specific port, 8080.

StreamConnectionNotifier server =
(StreamConnectionNotifier)Connector.open("socket://:"+8080);

As long as the server MIDlet was running, the client could try to connect to it. To
connect to the server the client needed to know its IP address and the port number that
it was listening on. The client MIDlet also uses the Connector class from the GCF, to
open a socket connection.

String serverIP = " 157.190.148.91
String name = "socket://" + serverIP+

+ 8080;

StreamConnection client = (StreamConnection) Connector.open(name);

Once the server received a connection request from a client and accepted it, a socket
connection was opened between the client and server.

StreamConnection serversocket = (StreamConnection) server.acceptAndOpen();
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When the socket connection was established, data could be exchanged between both
of the MlDlets. The StreamConnection interface that was used to create the
connection contained one underlying InputStream and one OutputStream object,
which were used to read and write data to and from the socket. Within both the client
and the server Ml Diet, the read and write objects that were used were
DataInputStream and DataOutputStream, respectively, which is the same as opening
an

InputStream

and

an

OutputStream.

The

same

DataInputStream

or

DataOutputStream was used for all of the data that was exchanged while the socket
was open and could be used to send or receive different types of data, such as integers
and strings.

DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(client.openDataInputStream());
DataOutputStream dops = new
DataOutputStream(client.openDataOutputStream());

As sockets contain a reliability protocol, TCP, every time a message is received the
receiving Ml Diet automatically sends back an acknowledgment message.

There was no restriction on how often data could be sent and received across the
socket connection; however, there was a limit to the size of the data message that
could be sent. Anything larger than 20 Kb would not be received intact. That meant
that any message greater than 20Kb, needed to be split into a number of smaller
messages that were sent in the correct sequence.

When the client was finished with the socket, the connection was closed.
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Open Socket + Listen
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Encrypted Message
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Encrypted Message
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Close Socket
Message Received - Acknowledgment

Close Socket
Message Received - Acknowledgment

Closing Client Socket

Closing Server Socket

Figure 5-2: Socket Sequence Diagram

Before the sockets could be fully implemented in NetBeans, the permissions for the
socket API needed to be set. This was done using the application descriptor, which
was located in the projects properties, and selecting the API permissions items that
were needed, these were:
Javax.microedition.io.Connector.socket and
Javax.microedition.io.Connector.serversocket.
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Figure 5-3: Adding API permissions in NetBeans

5.5 Sequence of events
Although there are a number of differences between the different encryption
algorithms, the majority of the sequence of events remains the same. However, the
RSA algorithm did not create a shared secret key. These events were:
•

Creating a socket connection,

•

Generating a key pair,

•

Exchanging public keys,

•

Creating a shared secret key

•

Encrypting data that was read from a text file,

•

Exchanging encrypted messages

•

Decrypting the messages that were received

•

Writing the decrypted data into a new text file.

This sequence of events is outlined below in figure 5-4
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Figure 5-4: Encryption Algorithm Sequences of Events

5.5.1 Key Pair Generation
Within all three algorithms both the client and server MlDlet must create a key pair,
since both are involved in performing the encryption and decryption methods. Both
the ECC and RSA methods are now examined.
5.5.1.1 ECC Key pair generation
Both the ECC algorithms generated their key pairs using the same method. The first
step involved in generating a key pair, was to identify the finite field that would be
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used, either GF (P) or GF (2). This could be done by either using explicitly created
parameters or by retrieving a named curve from a lookup table. The named curve
approach was used as it was outside the scope of this thesis to create the parameters
for a new mathematically secure ECC key pair. The named curves that were used
were “c2pnbl63vr’ for GF (P) and “prime 192vr’ forGF (2"') [82].

Once the finite field being used was selected, the parameters for that particular finite
field needed to be retrieved from a lookup table. This was done by using the
ECNameCurveParameterSpecO class, with the named finite field as its parameters.
This retrieved the parameters, for the named finite field, in the form of
X9ECParameters.

// using the (if (P) Held.
ECNameCurveParameterSpec ecSpec =
ECNameCurveParameterSpec.getParameterSpec("c2pnb 163 v 1");

However, these parameters needed to be converted into usable ECC domain
parameters, using the ECDomainParameters() class, fhe EC Domain Parameters were
then combined with a secure random number, which was generated using the
SecureRandomO class, using the ECKeyGenerationParameters() class. This created
the parameters that were used to initiate the generation of a secure ECC key pair.

//(ieneraling the ke> pair parameters.
ECKeyGenerationParameters ECKeyGenPara = new
ECKeyGenerationParameters(ECDomainParameters, new SecureRandomO);
//Initiating the key pair generation
ECKeyPairGenerator ECKeyPairGen == new ECKeyPairGenerator();
ECKeyPairGen.init(ECKeyGenPara);

As soon as the key pair generator was initiated the keys were generated and placed in
an AsymmetricCipherKeyPair “holding” class. This “holding” class contained the
public and private key parameters, and was used to generate the public and private
keys that were used throughout the program.
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//'I he holding class - As\ninictricC'iphcrKc\ Pair
AsymmetricCipherKeyPair KeyPair = ECKeyPairGen.generateKeyPairQ;
ECPublicKeyParameters ecPublicKey = (ECPublicKeyParameters)
KeyPair.getPublicO; // The l-CC public ke\
ECPrivateKeyParameters eePrivateKey = (ECPrivateKeyParameters)
KeyPair.getPrivateO; // 'I he I 'C'C private ke\

Figure 5-5: ECC Key Pair Class Diagram
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5.5.1.2 RSA Key pair generation
In order to provide the same level of security as the ECC algorithm, the RSA
implementation generated a 1024-bit key. The first step involved in generating the
RSA key pair was to define the public exponent that would be used. T he one that was
used was 65537, or in Hex 10001 [83], which was commonly chosen for its strong
security and its fast performance.

Biginteger thePublicExponent = new Biglnteger(" 10001", 16);

The next step was to generate the parameters used to create the RSA key. This was
done using the RSAKeyGenerationParameters constructor, which contained four
parameters; the public exponent, a secure random number, the strength/size of the key
and the certainty.

//Generating the RSA parameters
RSAKeyGenerationParameters RSAKeyGenParam =
new RSAKeyGenerationParameters(thePublicExponent, new SecureRandom(),
1024, 80);

Using these parameters the RSA key pair generator is initiated. The keys are then
generated and placed in a “holding’' class that is very similar to the ECC key pair
method. The “holding” class is then used to generate the public and private keys.

//Initiating the ke\ pair generation
RSAKeyPairGenerator theRSAKeyPairGen = new RSAKeyPairGeneratorQ;
theRSAKeyPairGen.init(RSAKeyGenParam);
//The holding class - As\ mmetricCiphcrKe\ Pair
AsymmetricCipherKeyPair theKeyPair =
theRSAKeyPairGen.generateKeyPairO;
RSAPrivateKey = (RSAPrivateCrtKeyParameters) theKeyPair.getPrivate();
RSAPublicKey = (RSAKeyParameters) theKeyPair.getPublic();
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Figure 5-6: RSA Key Pair Class Diagram

5.5.2 Exchanging public key
In order to encrypt and decrypt the data, each of the encryption algorithms needed to
exchange their public keys. However the public key generated by the ECC algorithms
and the RSA algorithm were in different formats. The ECC algorithms produced a
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public ECpoint Q, whereas RSA produced a public key containing a modulus and a
public exponent. That meant that two different key exchange methods were created.
5.5.2.1

ECC public key exchange

In order to encrypt or decrypt data, a shared secret key needed to be created. To do
this the public keys needed to be exchanged between the client and the server
MIDlets.

The

public

keys

that

are

generated

are

in

the

form

of an

ECPublicKeyParameters variable, which contained the EC Domain Parameters and an
ECpoint Q. This variable type couldn’t be sent across a socket so only one of the
parameters, the public point on the elliptic curve, Q, was sent. However before it
could be sent, it had to be converted into a byte[] variable as follows:

byte[] PublicKeybyte = ecPublicKey.getQ().getEncoded();

Once the public key was converted, it was sent across the socket to the other MI Diet,
where it had to be converted back into an ECPublicKeyParameters variable. In order
to convert it back, two variables were needed the EC Domain Parameters and the
X9EC Point. To generate these variables a combination of the byte[] variable that was
received and the object identifier (OID), which identifies the finite field, was used.

The first step in generating these variables, was to create a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
object using the received byte[] and the OID as parameters.

//creating the Alogirthmldenlifier - using the OID ol'thc c2pnbl63vl Held
Algorithmldentifier

algorithmidentifier

=

new

Algorithmldentifier(new

DERObjectIdentifierC’ 1.2.840.10045.3.1.1 ”));
//creating the SubjectPublicke\ Info - combining the OID and the received b>tel |
SubjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo = new
SubjectPublicKeyInfo(algorithmIdentifier, PublickeyRecieved);

Once the SubjectPublicKeyInfo object was created, the EC Domain Parameters and
the X9EC Point could be generated. To generate the EC Domain Parameters, the
parameters of the named curve being used needed to be found. Although the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo object contained the OID of the finite field, it did not contain
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the parameters for it. Finding the parameters was done in two steps, first by
generating

the

X962 Parameters

parameters

by

using

the

SubjectPublieKeyInfo.getAlgorithmId().getParameters() method and then by using
those parameters to identify the named eurve. The named eurve was then used to
generate the EC domain parameters.

//Generating the X962Parameters parameters
X962Parameters X962Parameters = (X962Parameters)
SubjectPublieKeyInfo.getAlgorithmId().getParameters();
//Identilying the named curve.
DERObjectIdentifier oid =
(DERObjectldentifier)X962Parameters.getParameters();
X9ECParameters ecP = X962NamedCurves.getByOID(oid);
// (ieneraling the I'C domain parameters
dParams = new ECDomainParameters(ecP.getCurve(), ecP.getG(), ecP.getN(),
ecP.getHO, ecP.getSeedO);

Onee the EC Domain Parameters were created the X9EC Point was calculated. This
was

achieved

by

using

another

SubjectPublicKeylnfo

method,

SubjectPublicKeylnfo.getPublicKeyO, to extract the public key. When the data was
extracted, it was in the form of a DERBitString object, which needed to be converted
to an ASN1 Octetstring object. This object was then combined with the curve
parameter, which was generated from the ECDomainParameters.getCurve() method,
to create the X9ECPoint.

DERBitString bits = keylnfo.getPublicKeyData();
byte[] data = bits.getBytes();
ASN 1 Octetstring key = new DEROctetString(data);
X9ECPoint derQ = new X9ECPoint(dParams.getCurve(), key);

Once both the ECDomainParameters and the X9ECPoint were extracted from the
received byte[] and the OID, they were then combined together within an
ECPublicKeyParameters constructor to generate the ECPublicKeyParameters. The
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newly converted ECPublicKeyParameters was then used to create the shared secret
key.

NewECPublicKeyParameters = (ECPublicKeyParameters)new
ECPublicKeyParameters(derQ.getPoint(), dParams);
ECDomainParamelors
-packiiQt# byte
*]
■package Biglncsger n
•package Biglnteger h
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'public OigliT.eger getH( )(|
'public byiefO *) getSeed( )()
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‘public
'public
■public
■public

' public irt geiFieldSizel H)
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•protected int padBits
•protected irt getPadDils! int bitString X)
•protected byte(0 ’) geiBytes! tni bltStrirg K)
public DER&tStnrxj getlnsiancei Objea obj)()
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protected DERBitStnngt byte data, int padBits 1()
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Figure 5-7: Exchanging Public Key Class Diagram
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5.5.2.2 RSA public key exchange
RSA generates a public key that is made up of two parts, the modulus and the public
exponent. Both parts are needed to encrypt data and so both were transferred to the
other MlDlet in the RSA MlDlet pair. Just like the ECC algorithm the RSA public
key could not be sent in the format that it was created, so each part needed to be
converted from a Biginteger to a byte[].

RSAPublicKey.exponent.toByteArrayO;
RSAPublicKey.modulus.toByteArrayO;

Once they were converted, each part was sent across the socket separately. When they
were received, they were converted back into Biginteger

Biginteger ReceivedExponent = new Biginteger (Exponent);
Biginteger ReceivedModulus = new Biginteger (Modulus);

However, in order to be able to use the public key to encrypt data, both parts needed
to be combined to create a RSA key parameter. This was done using the
RSAKeyParameters constructor, which contained three parameters, a Boolean value
stating if the key is private, the modulus and the exponent.

ReceivedkeyParameter = new RSAKeyParameters(false, ReceievedModulus,
ReceievedExponent);

As RSA does not use any shared secret key methods the RSAKeyParameters created
could be used to encrypt data.

5.5.3 Different Algorithms
There were two different ECC algorithms, which were implemented over two finite
fields used throughout this thesis, ECIES and a hybrid of ECC and AES. A third
encryption algorithm, RSA, was also implemented. Each algorithm used a different
pair of MIDlets and was implemented on both the client and server MlDlet.
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5.5.3.1

ECIES

The ECIES algorithm was implemented on two MIDlets, a elient and a server. The
main class that was used to perform this algorithm was the lESEngineQ, which was
located in the MobileLibrary library. IESEngine() is a supporting class that was used
to create an integrated encryption cipher that works on top of a key agreement cipher,
such as ECDH. The shared secret key was created automatically within the
lESEngineQ class.

In order for this encryption algorithm to work correctly, the client and server MIDlet
must contain the same lES parameters. If they don’t, then any encrypted messages
received would not be decrypted.

There were three parameters that needed to be defined: the derivation, the encoded
parameters for the KDF function and the size of the MAC key, which are defined
below.

byte[] derivation = new' byte[]{ 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8};
byte[] encoding = new byte[] {8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1};
int macKeySize = 128
lESParameters lESparam = new IESParameters(derivation, encoding,
macKeySize);

Once the parameters were defined, the algorithm needed to be set up in such a way
that it could be used in a stream mode. Three different parameters were needed to
perform this operation, the ECDHBasicAgreement which was the key agreement used
as the basis for the encryption algorithm, the KDF2BytesGenerator which was the key
derivation function used for the byte stream generation and the HMac which was the
message authentication code generator. Both the KDF2BytesGenerator and HMac
used a secure hash algorithm (SHAl) within their generation functions.

lESEngine lESEngEncrypt = new IESEngine(new ECDHBasicAgreementQ, new
KDF2BytesGenerator(new SHAlDigestQ), new HMac(new SHAlDigestQ));
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The next step was to initiate the algorithm with the private and public key parameters,
the lES parameters and defining whether the algorithm was to encrypt or decrypt the
data. The public key that was used was the public key that was received from the
other MlDlet. The first parameter within the initiating method was a Boolean
encryption value, which defined whether the message was to be encrypted or
decrypted. If the Boolean encryption value was set to true then the message was to be
encrypted otherwise it was decrypted.

IESEngEncrypt.init(true, ECCPrivateKey, NewECPublicKeyParameters,
lESparam);

The main function that was performed by the initiating method was to create a shared
secret key. Every time the encryption or decryption functions were called, the
initiating method was performed and a shared secret key was generated. The shared
secret key generated should have been the same for both the encryption and
decryption functions.

Once the algorithm had been initiated, data could be encrypted or decrypted. The
.processBlockO method was used to produce the ciphertext from the plaintext. The
method had three parameters, the plaintext, the offset integer and the length of the
plaintext that produced the ciphertext.

byte[] CipherText = IESEngEncrypt.processBlock(Message2encrypt, 0,
Message2encrypt.length);

The ciphertext was then sent to the other MI Diet, where it was decrypted. This was
performed using the same initiating method, however the Boolean encryption value
was changed to false and the .processBlock() method used the ciphertext and
ciphertext length to create the plaintext. The client and server MI Diets were able to
perform both encryption and decryption.
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Figure 5-8: ECIES Class Diagram

5.5.3.2

Hybrid - ECC and AES

Similar to the implementation of the ECIES algorithm, the hybrid algorithm was also
implemented on two MIDlets, a client and a server. This encryption algorithm
contained the same ECC key pair function and public key exchange as the ECIES.
However, this algorithm generated a shared secret key only when the public keys
were exchanged. That meant that the shared secret key was generated only once for
both the encryption and decryption functions.
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To generate the shared seeret key a basic ECDH key agreement was performed. This
combined the private key of the MIDlet and the received public key, which was the
other MIDlet’s public key, to generate a Biglnteger value. This value should have
been the same for both Ml Diets. The value generated could not be used as a shared
secret key as it was not in the correct format, so it was converted into an AES key.
This was done by initially converting it to a byte[] variable and then using the
SecretKeySpec methods to create a secret key. The SecretKeySpec method contained
the byte[] variable, an offset integer, the size of the key being generated and the
encryption algorithm being used.

SecretKey SecretKey = new SecretKeySpec(byte[] ShareSecretkeybyte, 0, 16,
"AES");

The key generated was a 128-bit AES key and should have been the same for both the
client and server MIDlet. The key was then converted to a CipherParameters object so
that it could be used with the encryption and decryption algorithms.

CipherParameters Secretkeyparams = new
KeyParameter(SecretKey.getEncoded());

The next step was to declare the AES stream cipher that would be used. As AES is a
block cipher, the CFB mode was used so that any length of data could be encrypted or
decrypted. The CFB method contained the cipher method being used, which was the
AESLightEngine method and the bit size of the block of data.

AESLightEngine blockCipher = new AESLightEngineQ;
CFBBlockCipher cfbCipher = new CFBBlockCipher(blockCipher, 8);
StreamCipher streamCipher = new StreamBlockCipher(cfbCipher);

Once the stream cipher was declared, it needed to be initialised. To do this the AES
shared secret key and a Boolean value, which was used to distinguish whether the
method was to encrypt or decrypt the data, were used.
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streamCipher.init(true, Secretkeyparams);

Then to encrypt or decrypt data the .processBytes() method was used. This method
contained five parameters: the data b>te array to be encrypted, an offset value, the
length of the data byte array, an output buffer that the encrypted data was sent to and
another offset. The data byte array could either contain plaintext or ciphertext and the
output buffer contained the opposite type.

streamCipher.processBytes(Text2encrypt, 0, Text2encrypt.length, ciphertext, 0);

There were a number of different classes used in this algorithm, which are illustrated
in the class diagram below.

AESLightEngino

CFBBIockCipher
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prrvatB byte Si[0 *1 = {)
prrvate int rconfO i * 0
private
private
•private
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private
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■private
pnvate

int m1 » 0x80808080
int m2 “ 0x7f7f7f7f
int m3 = 27
int ROUNDS
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Figure 5-9: Hybrid Algorithm Class Diagram

5.5.3.3

RSA

The RSA implementation used the same type of socket connection and message
exchange as the ECC algorithms. However, it did not encrypt and decrypt data using a
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shared secret key, like the ECC algorithms did. It used the public key to encrypt the
data and the private key to decrypt it.

The main issue with RSA is the fact that the data being encrypted could not be longer
than the key sizes. This meant that the data being encrypted needed to be broken
down into block sizes smaller than 1024-bits. However since padding was also used,
the actual size of these blocks depended on the type of padding being used. As the
padding that was used in this thesis was PKCSl Encoding, the block size was limited
to 117-bytes. As RSA was working with blocks of data it was set up as an
AsymmetricBlockCipher using the RSAEngine() class.

AsymmetricBlockCipher RSAEngine = new RSAEngine();
RSAEngine = new PKCSlEncoding(RSAEngine);

Before data could be encrypted or decrypted, the AsymmetricBlockCipher needed to
be initialised. The initiating method contained two parameters: a Boolean value,
stating if the data should be encrypted or decrypted and the key to be used. If data was
to be encrypted then the Boolean value was set to true and the key used was the one
that was received from the other Ml Diet. However if the data was to be decrypted the
Boolean value would be set to false and the key being used was the Ml Diets own
private key.

RSAEngine.init(true, ReceivedkeyParameter);
RSAEngine.init(false, RSAPrivateKey);

To encrypt or decrypt data the same method was used, the .processBlockQ. This
method contained three parameters: the input data which was either plaintext or
ciphertext, the offset and the length of the block of data.

byte[] DecryptedMessage =
RSAEngine.processBlock(beginingsubstring.getBytes(), 0
, beginingsubstring.getBytes().length);
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As the data to be encrypted was retrieved from the file, which contained large
amounts of data, the stream of data needed to be divided into small blocks. This was
done by converting the byte stream of data into a String of data, which was then
divided into substrings.

These substrings were converted back into byte[] so that they could be encrypted and
transmitted to the other MlDlet. Once the other MlDlet received the byte[] and
decrypted them, they were then converted back into strings so that they could be
joined back together to produce the full message.

Once the full message was decrypted and Joined together, it was then converted back
to a byte[] variable so that it could be written to a file.

Figure 5-10: RSA Class Diagram
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5.5.4 Accessing Files
The data being encrypted or decrypted was read from or written to files, respectively,
which were located on the host machines. To access the files, both the client and the
server, used the open method from the GCF Connector class and FileConnection
object. The following piece of code shows the MlDlet connecting to a text fie, called
Message2encrypt.txt, which was located in the “My Documents” folder on the host
machine.

FileConnection

file2

=

(FileConnection)

Connector.open("file:///My

Documents/Message2encrypt.txt");

In order to read from a file, an InputStream was established. A read() method was
used to read the bytes from the input stream and stored them in a byte array. This byte
array was then encrypted.

byte[] Message;
InputStream is = file2.openlnputStream();
int length = is.read(Message);

To write to a file, an OutputStream was established and a write() method was used to
write the data into a file. This method contained three parameters: the byte array
which contained the decr>'pted data, the offset integer and the length of the data.

OutputStream os = file2.openOutputStream();
os.write(MessageReceived, 0, MessageReceived.length);

However, as the CDLC didn’t contain an API for accessing files an optional API, JSR
75: PDA Optional Package for the J2ME Platform was needed.

Before files could be accessed within NetBeans, the file API permissions needed to be
set. Similar to sockets, the permissions are set by using the application descriptor,
located in the projects properties and selecting the API permissions, which in this case
were Javax.microedition.io.Connector.file.read and
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javax.microedition.io.Connector.file.write.
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Figure 5-11: Adding File API permissions in NetBeans

A number of different size text flies containing the sample data were created. The data
within these files was encrypted and sent to the other MlDlet where it was decrypted
and placed into different files, which were newly created using the create() method.
These files could then be accessed manually on the host machine, in order to check
that the data inserted was correct.

5.6 Client Interaction
The client MIDlet provided a few Graphical User Interfaces (GUI’s), which contained
a number of options for the user, which are outlined below in Figure 5-12.
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Figure 5-12: Client Interaction Use Case Diagram

These GUI’s enable the client to perform the following functions:
• Launch socket - This is the Tirst GUI that is presented to the client. It enables the
client to initiate the socket connection.
• Generate a key pair - Generates the client’s key pair and initiates the public key
exchange.
• Encrypt a message - To encrypt a message the client performs the following:
o Select whether the data would be encrypted twice. If the user wants to
encrypt a message twice, then the sequence of events is repeated. However
the second time the client encrypted the data, the data is read from the
decrypted message file.
o Select the size of the file to be encrypted. There were five different sizes for
the ECC algorithm, 2Kb, 5Kb, 20Kb, 50Kb and 100Kb. Whereas the RSA
algorithm used different size messages, which were 2Kb, 5Kb and 20Kb.
The file sizes for the RSA algorithm are smaller than the ECC algorithm
because of the way the RSA algorithm is implemented. As the data being
encrypted needs to be smaller than the key size, which is 1024-bits, the data
within the files needs to be split up in to blocks of size 11 Tbytes, which are
then encrypted. As the files increase in size then so to does the number of
blocks to be encrypted. For example, a 2Kb file needs 18 blocks whereas a
20Kb file needs 164 blocks. As the file size increases the number of blocks
needed becomes impractically large within the limited J2ME environment.
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o Generating a new key pair or else continue the encryption using the existing
key pair.
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Figure 5-13: User interaction GUI’s

5.7 Obfuscator
NetBeans comes with an open source obfuscator, called ProGuard, already built in.
By default the class files are not obfuscated, however it can be made part of the
normal program building process. To enable obfuscation, the obfuscation level could
be changed within the projects properties. The obfuscation level goes from 0, which
indicates that no obfuscation would be performed, to 9, which indicates that
everything except the public methods of the MIDlet class would be obfuscated.

Within this thesis all of the MIDlets obfuscation levels were set to 9. This reduced the
size of the MIDlets by about a half, from 203Kb to 95-100Kb.
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5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the implementation of the two ECC and the RSA
encryption algorithms using MlDlets. Also the three different tools used to develop
and implement the MlDlets were outlined. The NetBeans IDE, which was used for the
program development, and the Java WTK, which was used to implement the MlDlets,
were installed on both the desktop PC and the Laptop, whereas J9 VM was installed
on the PDA. Although CLDC provided a number of libraries, a third party library,
which was discussed in this chapter, was needed for the key pair generation and the
encryption/decryption methods.

This chapter also describes the socket network connection and provides an outline of
the sequence of events preformed by the encryption algorithms. Once the events were
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outlined, a detailed description of the encryption/decryption methods was provided,
along with the use case, class and sequence diagrams for these events.

In order to reduce the size of the MIDlets, obfuscation was performed.

The next chapter will examine the results obtained from testing both of the ECC
encryption algorithms on a laptop and a PDA, to determine which one is the most
efficient and compare the results obtained to those of the RSA algorithm.

86

Chapter 6: Performance Analysis
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an analysis of the performance of the ECC algorithms, using
both finite fields, on different mobile devices and across different types of networks.
A number of operations performed by each ECC algorithm are examined to determine
which finite field is the most suitable for mobile devices with limited resources.
Performance metrics are used to evaluate the operations performed by the ECC
algorithms, when integrated over different types of networks. These metrics are
response time, processing time and transfer time.

This chapter is dividend into two main sections. The first section describes the
performance of a number of different operations performed by the ECC Algorithms
and discusses which finite field performs the best on both ECC algorithms. The
second section discusses the performance of the ECC algorithms over a wired,
wireless, GPRS and 3G networks.

In addition, the performances of the ECC algorithms are eompared to the performance
of the RSA algorithm, which is implemented on the same devices and over the same
networks.

6.2 System Deployment
The MlDlets were deployed over three different devices, a Dell desktop PC, a laptop
and a PDA. The server MlDlet, for each of the encryption algorithms, was
implemented on a Dell PC (Microsoft Windows XP, Intel® Pentium®, CPU
2.00GHz, 512MB of RAM). Whereas the client MlDlets were implemented on two
devices, a Dell latitude D630 laptop (Microsoft windows XP, Intel® Core'^'^ 2 Duo
CPU2.00GHZ, 1.99GB of RAM) and a Dell Axim X51 PDA (Microsoft Windows
Mobile 5.0, Intel® PXA270, 520MHz, RAM 64MB, ROM 128 MB).
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The MIDlets were developed in NetBeans, with a minimum version of 5.5 and
implemented in WTK on both the PC and the laptop. The PDA used a version of
IBM’s J9 VM, which was specially designed for execution on a Dell Axim X51 using
Windows Mobile 5.0 and that implemented CLDC version 1.1 and MIDP version 2.0.

A wired LAN, 802.1 lb wireless network, a vodafone Ireland GPRS and 3G networks
were used to demonstrate the use of the two ECC and RSA algorithms and to provide
the network performance results. These are shown in figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1: IMI Diet's Test Bed

6.3 ECC Algorithm Performance
As the ECC encryption algorithms can be implemented over two finite fields, it is
important to determine which field is the most efficient on limited devices. To execute
and test the performance of the encryption algorithms, using both of the finite fields,
four test scenarios were employed. In all scenarios the client and server MIDlets are
executed on different devices across a network. In scenario A, the client MIDlets, for
both of the encryption algorithms, are executed on the laptop using the F(2"') field,
whereas in scenario B the F(2"') field is replaced with the F(p) field. In scenario C
and D, the client MIDlets are executed on a PDA with scenario C using the F(2"')
field and scenario D using the F(p) field. Each scenario is then compared with the
RSA algorithm.
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The following key aspects of the algorithm’s performance are examined and
measured:
•

The time taken to generate a key pair,

•

The time taken to generate the shared secret key for the hybrid algorithm,

•

The encryption time,

•

The decryption time.

These aspects are only measured on the client MIDlet, as most mobile devices will be
acting as clients within a network structure.

In order to generate the most accurate performance results, each encryption algorithm
was executed 10 times and the average result was used to analyse the performance of
each algorithm.

6.3.1 Generating key pair
To evaluate the time taken to generate a key pair, each scenario was executed and
using the GUI the user selected the option to create a key pair. The results generated
for scenario A and B are displayed below in figure 6-2.
Creating Key Pair

Figure 6-2: Creating a Key Pair (Laptop)

The time taken to create a key pair varies from 945 / 948 ms using the F(2"') field to
2,428 / 2,430 ms using the F(p) field to just over 39 seconds using RSA. There are
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two things that can be observed from these results. Firstly, the time taken for both of
the ECC encryption algorithms to create a key pair is dramatically shorter than the
time taken by RSA. This is to be expected as the RSA encryption algorithm uses a
much larger key size, of 1024-bits, than both of the ECC algorithms, which use 160bits for the F(p) field and 192-bits for the F(2"') field. Also, that both of the ECC
encryption algorithms take a similar amount of time to create the key pair. This is
because both algorithms use the same key pair method within the program.

The second thing that can be observed is that the F(p) field takes more than twice the
time to create a key pair than the F(2'”)field. Again this is to be expected as the
F(2"') field uses binary polynomials to calculate the key pair. As binary polynomials
use binary, which is the most basic format used by any electronic hardware and
software components; it needs fewer resources to carry out its calculations.

These results can now be compared to the results generated from scenario C and D,
where a PDA was used instead of a laptop.

Creating Key Pair

F(p)

2,029

2,073
29,123

RSA
Figure 6-3; Creating a Key Pair (PDA)

The most significant thing from these results is the faet that the PDA performs the
operation quicker than the Eaptop. Although the client MIDlets being executed on the
laptop and the PDA are the same, the VM being used is not. The J9 VM, which was
used on the PDA, was specially designed to contain only the standard APIs that were
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needed to implement MlDlets that use CLDC version 1.1 and MIDP version 2.0. As it
doesn’t contain extra, unnecessary APIs it can use all of the PDA’s processing power
to execute the MlDlets. However WTK was designed to execute not only MlDlets but
also larger J2SE programs, w-'hich need a lot more APIs and features. This means that
when WTK implements a MlDlet some of the processing power is being used to
execute unnecessary functionalities, which slows down the performance of the
MlDlet.

If we compare the CPU performances of the laptop and the PDA, it is

abundantly clear that the VM design has a dramatic impact on its performance.

Apart from the fact that the PDA generates a key pair faster than the laptop, the
results generated are very similar to the results generated from the laptop. It is again
obvious that the ECC algorithms, using both of the finite fields, can generate the key
pair nearly 15 times faster than the RSA algorithm. Also that the F(2'") field is
quicker than the F{p) field.

6.3.2 Encryption Time
To test the time taken to encrypt data, the user had to select the encryption option and
the file size to be encrypted using the GUI’s. Each scenario was executed 10 times
using different size files. The file sizes range from 2Kb to 100Kb for the ECC
algorithms and 2KB to 20KB for the RSA algorithm.

Before the ECC algorithms could be encrypt data a shared secret key needed to be
generated. For the ECIES algorithm the shared secret key was created within the
encryption and decryption operations, which meant that the time taken to create a
shared key is included in the time taken to encrypt or decrypt. However, for the
hybrid algorithm the shared secret key was generated before the encryption was
performed, which meant that the time taken to generate the shared secret key is
separate from the encryption or decryption time. The following table shows the time
taken to create the shared secret key for scenario A and B.

91

Hybrid (ms)

F(2'")

F(P)

959

2440

Table 6-1: Time taken to create Shared secret key (Laptop)

From table 6-1, it is obvious that the F(2"') field generates a shared secret key much
faster than the F(p) field. This can now be compared to the results generated from
scenario C and D.

Hybrid (ms)

F(2"')

F(p)

682

2399

Table 6-2: Time taken to create Shared secret key (PDA)

Again it is obvious that the F(2"') field performs the shared secret key generation
much quicker than the F(p) field and that the PDA performs the operation in a shorter
time than the laptop. However the time taken to perform the F(p) field was almost the
same on the PDA as it was the laptop, whereas the time taken to perform the F(2"')
field was nearly 60% faster on the PDA than the laptop.

The following figure 6-4, shows the results generated from encrypting a number of
different size files, using scenario A and B. The time taken to create the shared secret
key for the hybrid algorithm is not included in the time to encrypt.
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Encryption Time (Laptop)

RSA
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895

7224

ECIES - F(2^m)

1000

1005

1112
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2094

2469
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254

3094

5242

2586

7546

12847

517

1722

4186

8261

512

1726

4178

8332

+■

Figure 6-4: Encryption Time (Laptop)

Between scenario A and B for the ECIES algorithm, it is obvious that the F(2"')
performs the encryption quicker than the F(p) and as the file size gets bigger the time
taken to encrypt increases linearly. For example, a 20Kb file takes 1,1 12ms using the
F(2"') field and 2,586Kb using the F(p) field, whereas a 100Kb file takes 5,242ms
and 12,847ms respectively. This means that the best finite field to use with the ECIES
algorithm is the F(2"') field.

As for the hybrid algorithm, both of the shared secret keys which were produced from
scenario A and B performs the encryption operation in relatively the same time,
meaning that there is only milliseconds between them. Although the encryption time
is the same for both finite fields, the key pair and shared secret key operations are
much quicker for the F( 2"') field. This means that similar to the ECIES algorithm, the
F( 2"') field is the best field to be used with the hybrid algorithm.

It has already been determined that the F(2"') finite field is the most suitable field for
both of the ECC algorithms. However by examining figure 6-4 again, it is possible to
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determine which ECC algorithm, using the F(2"') field, performs better. Although the
hybrid starts off by encrypting the smaller files faster than ECIES, the time taken to
encrypt larger files increases at a faster rate than the ECIES algorithm. Also when you
add the time taken to generate the shared secret key, for the hybrid algorithm, to the
time take to encrypt data, it is obvious that the ECIES algorithm performs the whole
encryption operation much more quickly than the hybrid algorithm. For example, to
encrypt a 2Kb file using the ECIES algorithm takes 1,000ms; however to encrypt the
same file using the hybrid algorithm which took 959ms to generate the shared secret
key and 255ms to encrypt, it takes a total of 1,214 ms.

In order to evaluate the performance of both of the ECC algorithms fully, they are
both compared to the performance of the RSA algorithm. Although the RSA
algorithm was not used to encrypt any file larger than 20Kb, it is still obvious that the
ECC algorithms perform better than it. By examining the 5Kb size file, which is half
the size of an average MMS message, at 1,895 ms to encrypt using the RSA
algorithm, it is clear that RSA takes longer than ECIES which takes 1,005 ms and the
hybrid, which takes 517 ms. This time difference becomes more obvious as the file
sizes increase, for example a 20Kb size file takes 7,224 ms using RSA but only 1,112
ms using ECIES and 1,722 using the hybrid algorithm.

Table 6-3 illustrates the time taken to encrypt different size messages using both of
the ECC algorithms and comparing the results to RSA. It is obvious, with the
exception of the RSA / ECIES 2Kb and 5Kb files, that the ECC algorithms are
between 1.8 to 6.5 times faster than RSA.

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

RSA/ECIES F(2"')

1.1 times shorter

1.8 times longer

6.5 times longer

RSA/ ECIES F(p)

2.3 times shorter

1.3 times shorter

2.8 times longer

RSA/ Hybrid F(2"')

3.5 times longer

3.6 times longer

4.2 times longer

RSA/ Hybrid F(p)

3.5 times longer

3.6 times longer

4.2 times longer

Table 6-3: RSA to ECC algorithms Ratio (Laptop)

The following figure 6-5, are the results generated from scenario C and D.
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Encryption Time (PDA)
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9001
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451

740

1993

4598

9583

^ 2178
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Figure 6-5: Encryption Time (PDA)

I'he time taken to encrypt different size files, using the ECIES algorithm, is
approximately the same on the PDA as it is on the laptop. Although the encryption
method is performed faster on the PDA, the time taken to encrypt increasingly larger
files on the laptop increases between 1.2 to 1.6 times the time taken on the PDA.

However the hybrid algorithm performs differently on the PDA than on the laptop.
The F(p) field takes a few 100s of milliseconds longer than the F(2"') field to encrypt
the files. This means that the F(2"') field performs better than the F(p) field and that
the F(p) field takes longer to encrypt files on the PDA than it does on the laptop.
However once the F(2"') field encrypts files equal to or larger than 20Kb, it takes
longer to perform the encryption on the PDA than the laptop.

By examining figure 6-5 again it is possible to determine which ECC algorithm is the
most suitable for implementation on a PDA. Similar to the results generated on the
laptop, the ECIES algorithm performs better than the hybrid algorithm.
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It is also possible to examine whether the ECC algorithms perform better on the PDA
than RSA algorithm. With the exception of the ECIES algorithm using the F(p) field
to encrypt the 2 Kb and 5Kb files, the RSA algorithm takes between 1.03 to 5 times
longer to encrypt the files than all the other ECC algorithms.

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

RSA/ ECIES F(2"')

1.03 times longer

1.6 times longer

5 times longer

RSA/ ECIES F(p)

2.2 times shorter

1.7 times shorter

1.9 times longer

RSA/ Hybrid F(2"')

3.1 times longer

2.8 times longer

2.5 times longer

RSA/ Hybrid F(p)

1.4 times longer

1.7 times longer

2.2 times longer

Table 6-4: RSA to ECC algorithms Ratio (PDA)

6.3.3 Decryption time
To test the time taken to decrypt data, encrypted data was received by the client
MlDlet and decrypted. Similarly to the encryption method, each one of the scenarios
was executed 10 times using different size files. The shared secret key that was
created before the files were encrypted for the hybrid algorithm was used again to
decrypt the files. The following figure 6-6, illustrates the resulting times of the
decryption operation for scenario A and B.
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Decryption Time (Laptop)

Figure 6-6: Decryption Time (Laptop)

From the graph, it is obvious that the time taken to decrypt the files using the RSA
algorithm is dramatically larger than the time taken to decrypt using either one of the
ECC algorithms. RSA took between 3.9 to 28.9 times longer to decrypt than ECIES
using the F(p) field. If the two largest files, 50Kb and 100Kb, were decrypted using
RSA the time difference between RSA and the ECC algorithms would have continued
to increase, making the graph unreadable for the ECC algorithms.

The time taken to decrypt, using RSA, is nearly 10 times longer than the time taken to
encrypt the same message. This is because RSA’s private key is longer than its public
key. Whereas using the ECC algorithms, which uses the same size key for encryption
and decryption, the time taken to decrypt is almost the same as the time taken to
encrypt the same size files, with a difference of only a few milliseconds. This means
that both of the ECC algorithms perform the encryption and decryption operations in
a much shorter time than the RSA algorithm. For example, to encrypt and decrypt a
5Kb file, RSA takes a total of 19,413 ms whereas ECIES F(2"') takes a total of 2,020
ms and the hybrid F( 2^") takes a total of 1,028 ms.
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Similar to the encryption method, the F(2"') field performs much better than the F(p)
field within the ECIES algorithm but within the hybrid algorithm there is only a few
milliseconds of a difference in the performance between the finite fields. For example,
within the ECIES algorithm a 5Kb file took 1,015 ms to decrypt using the F( 2"') field
whereas it took 2,443 ms using the F(p) field. Within the hybrid, the same file was
decrypted in 1,725 ms using the F(2"') field and 1,721 using the F(p) field. Also by
comparing both of the ECC algorithms, it is obvious that the hybrid algorithm
performs better while decrypting smaller files than the ECIES algorithm, however
once it started decrypting files equal to or larger than 20Kb, ECIES performs better.

These results can now be compared with the decryption results generated from
scenario C and D.

Decryption Time (PDA)
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Hybrid - F(2^m)

179
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1730

4335

8626

Hybrid - F(p)

462

786

2170

4775

9024

Figure 6-7: Decryption Time (PDA)

Again similar to scenario A and B, the most striking thing from the graph is the time
taken by the RSA algorithm to decrypt the files. RSA takes between 3 to 24 times
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longer to decrypt different size files than the ECIES algorithm using the F(p) field,
which is the slowest ECC algorithm. This illustrates that the ECC algorithms are
better suited, than the RSA algorithm, to be implemented on mobile devices such as
laptops or PDAs.

The time taken to decrypt the files, using the ECC algorithms, is relatively similar to
the time taken to encrypt the files, with a difference of lO’s of milliseconds. As the
results are similar, it is obvious that the ECIES algorithm using the F(2'”) field is the
best performing algorithm for the PDA.

6.4 Network Performance
To thoroughly test the performance of the ECC algorithms, they are executed across
different types of networks, both wired and wireless. From the last section, ECC
Algorithm Performance, it was determined that the F(2"') field was the most efficient
finite field for both of the ECC algorithms. This meant that only scenarios A, which is
the client MlDlet being executed on a laptop using the F(2"') field and C, which is
the client MlDlets being executed on a PDA using the F(2"') field, needed to be
executed to test the performance of the algorithms across the networks.

6.4.1 Network Performance Measurements
Three metrics are used to analyse the performance of the ECC algorithms across the
different types of networks. These are Response Time, Processing Time and Transfer
Time and they were measured using Wireshark analyser [84].
6.4.1.1

Response Time

The response time is the total time taken for an application to service any given
request, such as the client requesting the server’s public key or exchanging an
encrypted message. This time will include any processing that is carried out by the
server. From the response time it is possible to work out two other metrics, the
processing time and the transfer time.
6.4.1.2 Processing Time
The processing time is the total time taken to complete a procedure or the time taken
from receiving a request to sending a response. For example when a client requests
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the server’s public key, it is the total time taken from when the server receives the
request to when it generates and sends its public key to the client. The processing time
and the response time can then be used to calculate the third metric, the transfer time.
6.4.1.3 Transfer Time
The transfer time is the total time taken for a message to just travel across the
network; it includes the request that is sent to the server from the client and the reply
from the server to the client. It can be calculated by subtracting the processing time
from the response time.

Transfer Time = (Response Time - Processing Time)

In the case of some of the encrypted message, they are split into smaller messages and
sent individually across the network.

The total transfer time is the sum of the

individual encrypted messages.

6.4.2 Exchanging Public Keys
To evaluate the time taken to exchange public keys, the client MlDlet sends its public
key to the server MlDlet and requests its public key. Once the server receives the
request, it generates a key pair and sends the newly created public key back to the
client. The response times of each of the encryption algorithms were examined over a
LAN, WLAN, GPRS and 3G network and their processing and transfer times were
retrieved. Figure 6-8 shows the results generated for the ECIES algorithm.
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ECIES - Exchanging Public Key(Laptop)

□ Response(ms)

21,269 21,586 23,350 22,697

H Processing(ms) 20,177 20,177 20,177 20,177
□ Transfer(iTis)

1,109

1,409

3,173

2,520

Figure 6-8: ECiES Exchanging Public Key (Laptop)

The processing time is the same for each of the network types as it is the same process
being executed on the same device; however the response and transfer times vary
between the different network types. The quickest network type is the LAN, with an
average response time of 21,269 ms and a transfer time of 1,109 ms. The slowest is
the GPRS network, with an average response time of 23,350 ms and transfer time of
3,173 ms. From this we see that the transfer time for the GPRS is 2.9 times that of the
LAN. Whereas the WLAN, with an average transfer time of 1,409 is 1.2 times that of
the LAN and the 3G, with an average transfer time of 2,520 is 2.3 times that of the
LAN.

These transfer results are as expected considering the LAN network can provide data
rates of up to IGbps, whereas the GPRS network can only provide data rates of up to
114Kbps. In turn the WLAN network can provide data rates of 45Mbps, which is
faster than the 3G network which can provide data rates of 2Mbps. Although GPRS
and 3G are both types of WANs, 3G is a newer technology than GPRS and so
provides faster data rates.

The next figure, figure 6-9, shows the results of the public key exchange from the
hybrid algorithm, which can be compared to the ECIES results.
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Hybrid - Exchanging Public Key (Laptop)

□ Response (ms)

25,712 26,010 27,805 27,164

■ Processing (ms) 24,610 24,610 24,610 24,610
□ Transfer (ms)

1102

1400 | 3,195 ^ 2554

Figure 6-9: Hybrid Exchanging Public Key (Laptop)

Although the processing time for the hybrid algorithm, at 24,610 ms, is slightly higher
than the ECIES algorithms, which is 20,177 ms, the transfer times are virtually
identical. This is to be expected considering the public keys generated for both of the
algorithms are the same size and that the networks are constant.

Both of the ECC algorithms can now be compared to the results generated for the
RSA algorithm, which is illustrated below in table 6-5.

RSA (Laptop)

LAN

WLAN

GPRS

3G

Response (ms)

42,955

45,936

51,281

47,750

Processing (ms)

40,351

40,351

40,351

40,351

Transfer (ms)

2,604

5,585

10,930

7,399

Table 6-5: RSA Exchanging Public Key (Laptop)

There are two things that are very obvious when comparing the RSA results to both of
the ECC algorithms results. The first is that the transfer time is longer for the RSA
algorithm than for the ECC algorithms. For the LAN network, RSA, at 2,604 ms takes
2.4 times longer to transfer the public key than the hybrid algorithm, which takes
1,102 ms and 3.4 times longer across a GPRS network. This is to be expected
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considering the key size used for RSA is much bigger than the key size used for either
of the ECC algorithms.

The second thing that is obvious, which is the same for the ECC algorithms, is the fact
that the LAN network is much quicker than the GPRS network, which is the slowest.
However the rate at which the data is transferred across the different types of
networks is slower for the RSA algorithm than for either of the ECC algorithms. For
example, the WLAN is 2.1 times that of the LAN for RSA, compared to 1.2 for
ECIES. 3G is 2.8 times that of the LAN for RSA compared to ECIES, which is 2.3
and GPRS is 4.1 times the LAN for RSA compared to 2.9 for ECIES. Again this is to
be expected due to the key size of the RSA algorithm. The bigger the data being
transmitted across a wireless network, in this case the public key, the longer it takes to
be transferred aeross different types of networks. This wili be shown in the next
section.

The above results focused on scenario A, which can now be compared with the
following results that focus on scenario C. However only two types of networks are
used for the PDA, these are the wireless LAN and GPRS. 4'his is because the PDA
does not allow for a wired network, unless it is directly connected to a PC and 3G was
not available for the PDA.

ECIES (PDA)

WLAN

GPRS

Response (ms)

21,592

23,320

Processing (ms)

20,177

20,177

Transfer (ms)

1,415

3,143

Table 6-6: ECIES Exchanging Public Key (PDA)

Hybrid (PDA)

WLAN

GPRS

Response (ms)

26,035

27,794

Processing (ms)

24,610

24,610

Transfer (ms)

1,425

3,184

Table 6-7: Hybrid Exchanging Public Key (PDA)
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RSA (PDA)

WLAN

GPRS

Response (ms)

45,874

50,783

Processing (ms)

40,351

40,351

Transfer (ms)

5,523

10,432

Table 6-8: RSA Exchanging Public Key (PDA)

The significance of these results is that the transfer times for scenario C are almost
identical to those in scenario A, which is to be expected considering that the networks
are constant. The processing times are also the same as those in scenario A, as the
procedures are being carried out on the server MIDlet which is constantly being
executed on the PC, despite the location of the client MIDlet.

6.4.3 Message Exchange
Now that the public keys have been exchanged, different size files can be encrypted
and transferred. To evaluate the time taken to exchange encrypted messages, the client
sends an encrypted message to the server, where it is decrypted and then re-encrypted
and sent back to the client. Each of the ECC algorithm encrypted files ranging from
2Kb to 100Kb and the results generated will be compared to RSA, with encrypted files
ranging from 2Kb to 20Kb. The encrypted data from the ECC algorithms were
transmitted in block sizes equal to or smaller than 20Kb. Whereas the encrypted data
from the RSA algorithm was transmitted in two different ways; the first involved
sending the individual blocks of encrypted data separately, one after another and the
second involved combining the single blocks of encrypted data into one large block
equal to or smaller than 20Kb.

Similarly to the public key exchange, the response times of each algorithm was
examined over a LAN, WLAN, GPRS and 3G network and their processing and
transfer times were retrieved. The following figures and tables are going to focus on
scenario A, starting with figure 6-10 and table 6-9, which shows the transfer time and
the processing time for the ECIES algorithm.
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Figure 6-10: ECIES File Transfer Time (Laptop)

ECIES

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

50Kb

100Kb

Processing (ms)

2,547

2,683

2,994

8,939

16,315

Table 6-9: ECIES File Processing Time (Laptop)

It is obvious from figure 6-10 that the LANs, both wired and wireless, transfer the
data faster than both of the WANs, GPRS and 3G. The transfer times vary from 40 ms
for a 2Kb file to 118 ms for a 100Kb file over a LAN. Compared to 2,773 ms for the
same 2Kb file to 81,556 for the same 100Kb file over a GPRS network. The transfer
time between both of the LANs is a lot bigger than the difference between both of the
WANs. For example, the WLAN is 6.2 times the wired LAN for a 2Kb file; which
increases to 9.9 for 100Kb files. Whereas with the WANs, GPRS is 1.5 times that of
the 3G for a 2Kb file but only increases to 2.1 times for 100Kb files. However, even
with these differences the WLAN is still the second fastest network. The WLAN
followed by GPRS and 3G are slower than the LAN due to their need to allocate a
greater number of wireless slots, which need to compete with other wireless traffic.

The processing time for the different file sizes is the same no matter what type of
network is being used. This is to be expected since all of the procedures are being
executed on the PC. The difference in the processing time for the first three files.
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ranging from 2Kb to 20Kb is only a few hundred milliseconds whereas there is a
difference of a few seconds for the files ranging from 20Kb to 100Kb. This was
expected considering the time taken to encrypt and decrypt different file sizes in
sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.

The next figure, figure 6-11, and table, table 6-10, show the results generated from
transferring files that were encrypted using the hybrid algorithm. These results can
now be compared to the results of the ECIES algorithm.

Hybrid - File Transfer Time
100000

E

,

50000

H

0

2Kb

□ LAN

5Kb

20Kb 50Kb 100Kb

38

93

148

169

247

413

756

1,399

■ WLAN

164

□ GPRS

2,776

5,689 23,785 66,754 95,242

□ 3G

1,068

3,327 16,536 30,07144,379

Figure 6-11: Hybrid File Transfer Time (Laptop)

Hybrid

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

50Kb

100Kb

Processing (ms)

524

1,165

4,379

11,143

23,539

Table 6-10: Hybrid File Processing Time (Laptop)

As the networks are constant, the LAN is still the fastest network for the hybrid
algorithm and the GPRS network is still the slowest. The hybrid algorithm transfers
the two smallest files, 2Kb and 5Kb, across the networks faster than the ECIES.
However, the files equal to or larger than the 20Kb file take longer to be transmitted.
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For example, in the LAN the 2Kb file is transferred in 23 ms for the hybrid algorithm
and 40 ms for ECIES. Whereas the 20Kb file takes 93 ms for the hybrid algorithm but
only 69 ms for ECIES.

Again the processing time for each of the file sizes is the same no matter what type of
network is used. However the processing time for the hybrid algorithm does not
include the time taken to create a shared secret key. These transfer and processing
times were expected considering the results generated in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3,
where the smaller files were encrypted and decrypted faster by the hybrid algorithm
but the larger files were encrypted and decrypted faster by ECIES.

Before the transfer time for the ECC algorithms can be compared to the RSA
algorithm, both of the RSA data transfer methods need to be examined. The following
figure, 6-12, and table, 6-11, illustrates the transfer time and process time when the
single blocks, of encrypted data, are transferred separately.

RSA

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

Processing (ms)

10,365

22,764

84,768

Table 6-11: RSA Individual Block Process Time (Laptop)
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Whereas the following figure, 6-13, and table, 6-12, illustrates the transfer time and
process time when the blocks of encrypted data are transferred together in one large
block of data.

RSA - File Transfer Time
30,000
E 20,000
10,000

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

□ LAN

306

912

1,033

■ WLAN

513

1,093

1,971

□ GPRS

6,008

8,060

28,256

□ 3G

3,329

5,206

18,846

Figure 6-13: RSA Block Transfer Time (Laptop)

RSA

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

Processing (ms)

10,579

23,101

85,634

Table 6-12: RSA Block Process Time (Laptop)

It is obvious by examining the two figures, 6-12 and 6-13, that the encrypted data
takes longer to be transmitted when single blocks of data are transmitted separately.
With the two LANs, the difference between the two methods is between lO’s and
lOO’s of milliseconds, whereas the difference between both of the WANs is between 2
and 14 seconds. This is to be expected since fewer packets need to be transmitted
across the networks when a single block of encrypted data is sent. Although the
transfer time is faster when only one block of data is being transferred, the process
time increases by between 200 and 850 milliseconds. Again this was expected, as
extra processing time was needed to split the single block of encrypted data into
smaller blocks so that it could be decrypted. This means that for both of the LANs, the
time saved by transferring only one block of data is lost because of the extra
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processing time. However for the WANs there is still between 2 and 12 seconds
saved, when the extra processing time is taken into account.

Similar to the ECC algorithms the LANs are still quicker than the WANs. However it
takes longer to transfer the smallest file, 2Kb, encrypted by RSA than it does to
transfer the largest file, 100Kb, encrypted by either of the ECC algorithm. For
example, with the LAN it takes 306 ms to transfer the 2Kb file, in one block, using
RSA but only 118 ms for the 100Kb file using ECIES and 169 ms for the 100Kb file
using the hybrid algorithm. This is 2.5 and 1.8 times the ECC algorithms,
respectively.

Not only does it take longer to transfer the files using RSA but it also takes longer to
execute the procedures. A 2Kb file takes 10,365 ms to be encrypted and decrypted by
the server MIDlet, whereas the same file can be encrypted and decrypted in 2,547 ms
by ECIES and 524 ms by the hybrid algorithm. This is 4.1 and 19.9 times the ECC
algorithms, respectively.

The following tables will focus on scenario C, which will be compared to the results
of scenario A.

ECIES (PDA)

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

50Kb

100Kb

WLAN

245

268

316

473

1,170

GPRS

4,201

5,945

22,918

46,351

81,790

Table 6-13: ECIES File Transfer Time (PDA)

Hybrid (PDA)

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

50Kb

100Kb

WLAN

163

239

413

758

1,400

GPRS

2,787

5,691

23,905

66,862

95,307

Table 6-14: Hybrid File Transfer Time (PDA)
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RSA (PDA)

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

WLAN

577

1346

2735

GPRS

8,396

9,680

42,044

Table 6-15: RSA Individual Block Transfer Time (PDA)

RSA (PDA)

2Kb

5Kb

20Kb

WLAN

517

1,073

1,961

GPRS

6,015

8,072

28,259

Table 6-16: RSA Block Transfer Time (PDA)

Yet again, the transfer times for scenario C are virtually the same as those in scenario
A, due to the fact that the networks are constant. The processing times for scenario C
are the same as the processing times for scenario A, as the server MIDlet performs the
processes, which are located on the PC.

6.5 Conclusion
There were two objectives for this chapter. Firstly, to provide a performance analysis
of the ECC algorithms, using both of the finite fields and determine which field was
the most efficient for mobile devices. The second objective was to provide a
performance analysis of the ECC algorithms over a wired LAN, 802.11b wireless
network, a national GPRS and 3G networks. In each of the performance analyses, the
ECC algorithms were compared to the RSA algorithm.

The first section of this chapter presented the results of four separate scenarios, which
included the implementation of both of the finite fields on two different devices.
Three different operations, which were performed by each of the scenarios, were
examined and the results were analysed. The F(2"') field performed each of the
operations quicker than the F(p) field. For example using scenario A and B to create a
key pair, the F(2"') field took 945 ms whereas the F(p) took 2,428 ms for the ECIES
algorithm. For the hybrid algorithm the F(2'”) field took 948 ms and the F(p) took
2,430 ms. Not only is the F( 2"') field faster than the F(p) field but it also uses a bigger
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key size, of 192-bits. This illustrates that the F(2"') field is the best finite field for
mobile devices.

The results generated for each scenario were then compared to the performance
results of RSA. This illustrated that either one of the ECC algorithms performed more
efficiently than RSA. A 5Kb file was encrypted in 517 ms by the hybrid algorithm, in
1,005 ms for ECIES and in 1,895 ms by RSA. As the file sizes increased, the time
different between the ECC algorithms and RSA increased dramatically.

This section also illustrated that the PDA performed the encryption operations quicker
than the laptop, showing the importance of the VM.

The second section of this chapter provided a performance analysis of the encryption
algorithms being implemented over different types of networks. It is clear from the
results generated that the LANs, both wired and wireless, are quicker at transferring
any amount of data than the WANs. For the laptop, the fastest network available was
the wired LAN, however for the PDA it was the WLAN. Although scenario C was
only implemented across a WLAN and GPRS, it can be assumed that transferring data
across a 3G network would be quicker than across GPRS on a PDA. This is because
the transfer time for the WLAN and the GPRS were virtually the same on the PDA as
they were on the laptop. So by using the results obtained from the laptop, which
showed that 3G is quicker than GPRS, it can be assumed that 3G would also scale
with the other times.

The results generated for scenario A and C in this section were compared to the
results generated from the RSA algorithm, which performed the same operations over
the same networks. Again the comparison showed that RSA is much slower at
transferring any amount of data over any type of network, when compared to the ECC
algorithms.
This gives us a good understanding of the performance of these algorithms in mobile
applications.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and future works
Modern wireless networks are currently evolving and improving at a very rapid rate.
In order to take advantage of these improvements, mobile devices such as PDAs or
smartphones are being developed with new features. Some of these features include
the ability to transfer large amounts of data and images across wireless networks.

In addition, as more personal or corporate business is being conduced over the
Internet, using these mobile devices, mobile security is becoming a serious issue.
Most wireless networks provide some level of security, usually in the form of
encryption algorithms such as A5, WEP or WPA. However, a lot of the algorithms
currently being used have security weaknesses and have been cracked. Thus new,
more secure encryption algorithms need to be implemented. AES is starting to be
implemented in a number of new technologies, such as WPA2. Although it has a
strong mathematic cipher and is an improvement on some of the existing implemented
encryption algorithms, it still has the same weaknesses as all other symmetric
algorithms, which is the need to transmit the shared secret key across an unsecured
channel. To overcome the weaknesses of the symmetric algorithms, asymmetric
algorithms should be used. ECC is becoming one of the most attractive asymmetric
encryption algorithms, due to its strong mathematical cipher and small key sizes.

This thesis has examined the implementation of two ECC encryption algorithms, over
two finite fields, on two mobile devices across a number of different types of
networks. In order to achieve a comparative understanding, the performances of the
ECC algorithms were compared to RSA.

Before the ECC algorithms could be implemented a number of different areas, which
were divided into different chapters, were examined. Chapter 2 outlined the three
different types of wireless technologies available WAN, LAN and PAN, and the
security techniques that are implemented on each one. It also outlined some of the
security weaknesses on these networks, such as the weak encryption algorithms like
A5. This chapter also gave an overview of three cryptography algorithms and a
review of existing literature on mobile security. Chapter 3 discussed the encryption
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algorithms, AES and ECC, used throughout this thesis and the main reason why ECC
is becoming an attractive alternative to RSA, which is its small key size. It mainly
focused on the two finite fields, F(2"') and F(p), which are used within the ECC
algorithms, ECDEP and the two ECC encryption algorithms that were implemented.
However before the algorithms could be implemented a suitable architecture, J2ME,
needed to be examined, which was done in Chapter 4. Setting up a network
connection and a technique, called obfuscation, which can reduce the size of Java
programs, were also examined within this chapter.

As ECC can be implemented using two different finite fields, each of the finite field
were examined and analysed to determine which one was the most efficient on mobile
devices. The F(2"') field that was implemented used a bigger key size, of 192-bits,
than the F(p) field, which only used 163-bits. However from the results generated, it
was determined that for both of the ECC algorithms, ECIES and the hybrid, the F(2"')
field was usually more than twice as fast as the F(p) field. As the F(2"') field
performed the encryption operations the quickest, while using a bigger key size, it
was determined to be the most suitable finite field for implementation on mobile
devices. Along with analysing the finite fields, both of the ECC algorithms were
examined. Taking into account the time taken to create a shared secret key, encrypt
and decrypt different size files, ECIES performed the best over all. It also contained a
message authentication, which provides an extra element of security.

After determining that the F(2"') finite field should be used for the ECC algorithms,
both of the ECC algorithms were tested over a wired, wireless, GPRS and 3G
network, using the socket connection discussed in chapter 4.

The results generated from testing the ECC algorithms were compared to the
performance results of RSA. These results showed two things:
A) That ECC is a lot more suitable than RSA for implementation on mobile devices.
B) ECC is not only quicker than RSA at performing the encryption/decryption
processes but also at transferring the data across the networks.
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From the results obtained, it was proven that the GF (2"') finite field performs better
overall than the GF(p) finite field and that the type of network can have a serious
effect on the transfer of data. It also reinforced the fact that RSA is not suitable for
mobile devices, whereas ECC is. ECC, using GF (2"') finite field, provides a high
level of security while not exhausting the limited resources available on mobile
devices. This means that ECC could be implemented on a number of other small
devices, such as mobile phones. It could also be implemented on wireless networks,
as a replacement to WEP, A5 or AES.

7.1 Future Work
This thesis focused on the speed and efficiency of the ECC algorithms, using both of
the finite fields, on mobile devices and compared the performance results to RSA.
However the security levels for each of the algorithms were taken for granted. This
leads to an area of future work for this project, which is to examine the robustness and
security provided by the ECC algorithms, using the different finite fields and
comparing it to RSA. As the smallest key used by the F(2'") field is a larger than the
smallest key used for the F(p) field, it should be examined to see if the F(2"') field
provides the same level of security or if its more or less secure than the F(p) field.

Throughout this thesis the ECC algorithms were implemented and tested manually on
mobile devices. However, chapter 2 illustrated a number of security weaknesses
within the encryption algorithms used by the wireless technologies. Taking this into
account, an important area of future investigation is the implementation of the ECC
algorithms on a much wider scale. At present the implementation of ECC on wireless
technologies is mostly theoretical; this means that there has been a lot of talk about
the benefits of using ECC on wireless networks, while most systems still use AES or
weaker encryption algorithms, such as A5 or WEP. Implementing and using ECC on
wireless technologies could dramatically increase the level of security that is
provided.
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